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Abstract
Stochastic Flocking and Its Application to Systemic Risk
with Jumps
Yi-Tai Chiu
In this dissertation, we first study the effect of jumps on a stochastic flocking
model and discuss characteristics of this model. We investigate its application
to understand systemic risk by proposing an interbank lending model with jump
diffusions and further show that there will be a higher systemic risk with jumps
(i.e., sudden increases or decreases in reserves) in our model. Then, to examine
how the systemic risk will be affected when each bank is acting toward their best
self-interest, we integrate a game feature with jumps where each bank controls its
rate of borrowing/lending to a central bank. We then solve Nash equilibria with
finitely many players in this game with jumps, within which the central bank acts
as a clearing house and adds liquidity to the system. The result indicates that the
linear growth contributed by jumps to the system does not affect the systemic risk
in the model. Finally, we propose another model with a central bank as well as
peripheral banks and investigate the impact of interaction between all banks on
systemic risk. The systemic risk might be reduced if the central bank is allowed
to monitor liquidity by solving an optimal control problem. We also provide a
mean-field game approach to approximate the equilibria for finitely many players.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
1.1 Stochastic flocking with jumps
Flocking is a natural behavior exhibited by a group of birds traveling in unison
during flight. It can also be used to describe similar group behavior of other species
such as insects or fish and is recently discussed in several papers [Aoki, 1982],
[Partridge, 1982], [Toner and Tu, 1998], [Milewski and Yang, 2008] and [Degond
and Motsch, 2008]. Flocking behavior is based on two simple rules: velocity
alignment and group formation. Velocity alignment suggests that individuals
in a group are moving towards the weighted average speed of their neighbors
according to the interaction in the group. Group formation shows that individuals
are traveling within a certain range. In other words, a group of individuals that
demonstrates flocking behavior will be steering towards the same direction within
a parallel timeframe.
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Cucker and Smale proposed a deterministic model that can capture the flocking
behavior without the stochastic noise term in [Cucker and Smale, 2007]. In [Ha
et al., 2009], the authors introduce the stochastic Cucker-Smale (SCS) model and
study the time-asymptotic flocking in the SCS model where the noise term is
driven by Brownian motions. Previous studies that model flocking behavior such
as [Ha et al., 2009] do not deal with the case that allows sudden dramatic increase
or decrease in the velocity of particles. In this study, we apply a stochastic model
to illustrate flocking behavior where we treat each bird as a random particle in
space. We denote the coordinates (xit, v
i
t), to be the position and velocity that
describe the flocking behavior mathematically (see Chapter 2). We expect that
the flocking criteria will hold when we replace the noise term Brownian motions
with Levy processes (i.e. the velocity of particles is allowed to decrease or increase
dramatically).
1.2 Systemic risk with jumps
Since the 2008 financial crisis, in particular, after the Lehman Brothers Bank-
ruptcy, modeling risk in banking system and preventing the systemic risk has
become an important topic. Many researchers have investigated systemic risk
and its impact on the banking market [Carmona et al., 2014], [Garnier et al.,
2013], [Fouque and Ichiba, 2013], [Ichiba dn Shkolnikov, 2013], [Capponi and
Chen, 2013] and [Bo and Capponi, 2015]. There are two major approaches for
2
modeling systemic risk. One approach to model systemic risk is by describing
the system failures due to contagion of counterparty risk in a financial network
as stated in [Acemoglu et al., 2013]. Another approach is through diffusion based
models as studied in [Fouque and Ichiba, 2013] and [Garnier et al., 2013]. More
topics about systemic risk has also been studied in [Fouque and Langsam, 2013].
In this study, we will discuss systemic risk via diffusion based modeling.
Systemic risk is defined in [Fouque and Sun, 2013] as the risk that all banks will
bankrupt simultaneously for a given horizon time. It is a rare event that may oc-
cur under certain circumstances and sometimes lead to catastrophic consequences.
In this study, our goal is to establish a mathematical model to characterize the
banking system and the effect on systemic risk when each bank has instantaneous
supply and demand shocks, sudden bankruptcy, or positive or negative news in
the market. For example, the event that the central bank of China greatly reduces
the bank reserve requirements might increase the systemic risk of China’s entire
banking system. To get a more in-depth understanding of systemic risk that may
help us to navigate and further prevent such events, we propose an interbank bor-
rowing and lending model that allows sudden increases or decreases in individual
bank reserves to illustrate systemic risk by using a stochastic flocking system. In
addition, to explore if systemic risk will be affected when each bank is acting solely
in their best interest, we create another model based on the assumption that each
bank controls its rate of borrowing/lending to a central bank. The result of the
3
research aims to inform future practice in understanding and modeling systemic
risk.
This study is built on the research result of [Carmona et al., 2014]. The authors
propose a mathematical model to characterize systemic risk and further discuss
and analyze systemic risk using game features and mean field games. However,
the above research does not discuss the impact of jumps to systemic risk. In this
study, we first illustrate the characteristics of systemic risk by applying a dynamic
of stochastic flocking system with jumps. Then, we extend the previous research
on systematic risk and investigate the effect on systemic risk when each bank is
allowed to have instantaneous shocks or sudden bankruptcy.
In a fixed time period, a systemic risk is characterized by a large number of
banks reaching a certain critical level. Here we anticipate a small probability that
every bank will bankrupt simultaneously. In order to obtain this probability, we
need an explicit formula to calculate the distribution of the first passage time for
a stochastic process with jumps. However, such explicit formula is hard to obtain.
Therefore, we use the Laplace transform approach and the inversion formula to
calculate this probability. Our model integrates a game feature with jumps where
each bank controls its rate of borrowing/lending to a central bank. We use game
theory and stochastic optimal control with jump processes to analyze the impact
of jumps to our interbank borrowing and lending model.
4
1.3 Outline of the dissertation
In Chapter 2, we briefly introduce the Cucker-Smale model as stated in [Ha
et al., 2009] and review the background of Le´vy processes needed for stochastic
flocking with jumps. We then propose a stochastic Cucker-Smale (SCS) model
with jumps and further investigate the time-asymptotic flocking in both linear
and radially symmetric communication rate cases. We provide an estimate of
fluctuation of all particles for characterizing the flocking behavior in a jump phe-
nomenon. We also give some simulation results of the SCS model to illustrate
flocking behavior. At the end of this Chapter 2, we propose a new flocking model
with a specified central particle that lays the foundation for building an interbank
system with a central bank that we will discuss in Chapter 5.
In Chapter 3, we start with a systemic risk model with N banks similar to
[Fouque and Sun, 2013] and further investigate its mean field limit. Then, we
study the systemic risk with jumps through simulating the reserve processes and
obtain a formula for the systemic risk through an inversion Laplace transform of
the distribution of the first passage time.
In Chapter 4, we investigate the stochastic differential game with jumps as
well as its impact on systemic risk. In section 4.1, we give the needed background
material on stochastic optimal control with jump diffusions for obtaining the Nash
equilibrium in a stochastic differential game. In section 4.2, we search for a feed-
back equilibria by using both a forward-backward stochastic differential equation
5
(FBSDE) and HJB approach. We then provide some numerical results and discuss
the effect of jumps on systemic risk with combining a game feature.
In Chapter 5, we propose a new model with a central bank and peripheral
banks. We study their interactions between each other and how this interactions
affect systemic risk. Then, we solve a control problem that the central bank can
now control its rate of interactions and investigate the result with a solved optimal
response. We also give a possible approach to approximate the Nash equilibrium
in a finite player game with a central bank.
6
Chapter 2
Stochastic Flocking Model
2.1 Introduction
There has been much research about flocking, schools or swarming [Aoki,
1982], [Aoki, 1982], [Partridge, 1982] and [Toner and Tu, 1998], yet only a few
of them discuss stochastic flocking. In nature, flocking is a phenomenon demon-
strated by a group of birds flying and swooping in a highly coordinated union. In
this chapter, we consider stochastic flocking as a behavior exhibited by a group
of particles in which each particle mirrors or shadows each other’s movement
while interacting with dramatic, random environmental factors that we identify
as jumps.
In [Cucker and Smale, 2007], the authors proposed a deterministic flocking
model that considers a group of birds in which each bird alters its velocity towards
the average of its neighbors’ velocities. Let (xit, v
i
t) ∈ R2d for i = 1, ..., N be the
7
position and the velocity of birds, respectively. The Cucker-Smale (C-S) model is
described as:
dvit =
α
N
N∑
j=1
φ
(
xjt , x
i
t
) (
vjt − vit
)
dt
dxit = v
i
tdt, i = 1, ..., N,
where α ≥ 0 is the coupling strength and φ is a nonnegative function defined as
the communication rate which satisfies the following conditions:
(symmetry) φ
(
xit, x
j
t
)
= φ
(
xjt , x
i
t
)
, i = 1, .., N,
(translation invariance) φ
(
xit +M,x
j
t +M
)
= φ
(
xit, x
j
t
)
, for M ∈ Rd.
Given the positions of two brids, the communication rate φ in [Cucker and
Smale, 2007] depends on the distance between two birds in a space (d = 3). The
closer the physical distance of two birds are, the stronger the communication
rate between the two will be. More precisely, φ is defined as a non-increasing
function of the distance. In [Cucker and Smale, 2007], they show that under
certain circumstances, flocking will emerge based on the initial configuration. The
C-S model has been applied to different fields, especially in physics [Carrillo et
al., 2010], [Ha et al., 2014] and [Li and Xue, 2014].
In [Ha et al., 2009], they extend the C-S model and propose a new stochastic
flocking system by adding noise terms into the dynamics of velocity. In this
new stochastic flocking system, each bird exhibits interactions with the random
environmental factors. In addition, the velocity of each bird is influenced by noise
8
terms that varies over time. However, the noise terms in [Ha et al., 2009] do not
include jumps—the primary focus of this Chapter. The velocity of any bird may
increase or decrease dramatically in the presence of random jumps, which may
further cause the failure of the flocking behavior. Our goal in this chapter is to
investigate whether the flocking behavior can be anticipated with random noises
including jumps. Jump processes are a type of Le´vy process. In the next section,
we give some background on Le´vy processes.
2.2 Background of Le´vy processes
In this section, we review the basic concepts and results of Le´vy processes
needed to understand stochastic flocking with jumps. A Le´vy process is a stochas-
tic process that possesses continuous or discontinuous paths [Applebaum, 2004],
[Bertoin, 1998], [Sato, 1999]. They have been widely applied in many fields in-
cluding finance [Cont and Tankov, 2003] and engineering [Kyprianou, 2013]. The
definition of Le´vy processes is as follows:
Definition 2.1. A one dimensional stochastic process L = (Lt, t ≥ 0) defined on
a probability space (Ω,F ,P) is said to be a Le´vy process if it has the following
properties:
1. L0 = 0 almost surely.
2. L has stationary and independent increments.
9
3. L is continuous in probability. i.e.,
∀ > 0 and s ≥ 0, limt→s P (|Lt − Ls| > ) = 0.
To understand more about Le´vy processes, we provide the following theorem
that illustrates the characteristic function of Le´vy processes.
Theorem 2.1. (Le´vy-Khintchine formula for Le´vy processes) Suppose there
exists a triplet (a, σ, ρ), where a ∈ R, σ ≥ 0 and ρ is a measure satisfying
ρ ({0}) = 0 and
∫
R
(
1 ∧ x2) ρ (dx) <∞.
Then there exists a probability space (Ω,F ,P) on which a Le´vy process has the
following characteristic function:
E
(
eiθLt
)
= e−tΨ(θ) for all t ≥ 0,
where Ψ is defined as
Ψ (θ) = iaθ +
1
2
σ2θ2 +
∫
R
(
1− eiθx + iθx1(|x|<1)
)
ρ (dx) , for any θ ∈ R.
The proof can be found in [Bertoin, 1996]. Measure ρ is called the Le´vy
measure that describes the sizes and rates for which jumps of Le´vy process occurs.
We call (a, σ, ρ) the generating triplet of Lt. The quantities a, σ and ρ are the
drift, the Gaussian variance and the Le´vy measure of Lit, respectively. One can
observe that a standard Brownian motion is one of the Le´vy processes where the
triplet is given by (0, 1, 0) . The following is a classic example of Le´vy processes:
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Example 2.1. (Compound Poisson processes) Let
Lt =
Nt∑
i=1
ξi,
where Nt is a Poisson process with intensity λ, and jump sizes {ξi, i ≥ 1} are
i.i.d. random variables with common law F, independent from Nt. The character-
istic function of Lt, for θ ∈ R, is given by
E
[
eiθ
∑Nt
i=1 ξi
]
= e−λt
∫
R(1−eiθx)F (dx) = e−tΨ(θ).
where Ψ (θ) = λ
∫
R
(
1− eiθx)F (dx) .
The triplet (a, σ, ρ) is then given by a = −λ ∫ x1(|x|<1)F (dx) , σ = 0 and
ρ (dx) = λF (dx) .
For discontinuous Le´vy processes at t ≥ 0, we introduce the jump part of Lt
which is defined as
∆Lt = Lt − Lt− .
Let B be the family of Borel sets U ⊂ R and {0} 6∈ U¯ . For any U ∈ B we
define
N (t, U) = N (t, U, ω) =
∑
0<s<t
χU (∆Ls) .
N (t, U) is called the Poisson random measure which is the number of jumps of size
∆Ls ∈ U which occur before or at time t. The following theorem indicates that
any Le´vy process can be decomposed into the sum of continuous and discontinuous
stochastic processes.
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Theorem 2.2. (Le´vy-Ito decomposition) Let {Lt}t≥0 be a Le´vy process. Suppose
that a ∈ R, σ ≥ 0 and ρ is a measure satisfying
ρ ({0}) = 0 and
∫
R
(
1 ∧ x2) ρ (dx) <∞.
We then have
Lt = at+ σWt +
∫
|x|≤1
xN˜ (t, dx) +
∫
|x|>1
xN (t, dx) ,
where N˜ (t, dx) = N (t, dx)− tρ (dx) is a compensated martingale.
The proof of the above theorem can be found in chapter 2 in [Kyprianou,
2006]. Similar to the Ito formula for stochastic processes with continuous paths,
we have a more general formula for Le´vy processes in the one dimension case, i.e.,
when d = 1.
Theorem 2.3. (Ito’s formula) Let {Lt}t≥0 be a Le´vy process with triplet (a, σ, ρ)
and f : R→ R a C2 function. Then
f (Lt) = f (0) +
∫ t
0
σ2
2
f
′′
(Ls) ds+
∫ t
0
f
′
(Ls−) dLs
+
∑
0≤s≤t
∆Ls 6=0
[
f (Ls− + ∆Ls)− f (Ls−)−∆Lsf ′ (Ls−)
]
.
Proof of this can be found in [Cont and Tankov, 2004]. Note that the Ito’s
formula for Le´vy processes is different from the one for Brownian motion only in
the last term that involves the sum of each discontinuity of Le´vy processes. In
the next section, we will examine further on the stochastic flocking model.
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2.3 Stochastic Cucker-Smale (SCS) flocking model
In this section, we will give an estimate of the fluctuation of all particles in the
stochastic system with random jumps. We will study the interactions between all
particles and the environment with random noise and with jumps. Our main goal
is to extend the result of [Ha et al., 2009] which is a stochastic version of C-S model
driven by Brownian motions. We replace the noise terms, Brownian motions, in
[Ha et al., 2009] with Le´vy processes and investigate the time-asymptotic flocking
within such stochastic particle systems. Within the nonlinear stochastic system,
we only discuss the case of d = 1 for the purpose of simplicity. Similar to the
C-S model, we consider a nonlinear system with N autonomous particles with the
pair (xit, v
i
t) ∈ R2, i = 1, .., N, where xit and vit are regarded as the position and
the velocity of birds, respectively.
The SCS model with jumps states the following:
dvit =
α
N
N∑
j=1
φ
(
xjt , x
i
t
) (
vjt − vit
)
dt+ dLit
dxit = v
i
tdt, i = 1, ..., N,
(2.1)
where Lit is a Le´vy process with the triplet (a, σ, ρ
i). In spite of the importance
of the initial configuration in the C-S model, we assume that the initial condition
is a deterministic value, i.e., (xi0, v
i
0) = (x0, v0) , i = 1, .., N, since such conditions
will not affect our analysis in time-asymptotic flocking.
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Note that for every t > 0, Lit are i.i.d. random variables. In addition, for
i = 1, ..., N , the Le´vy-Ito decomposition yields
Lit = at+ σW
i
t +
∫
|x|<1
xN˜ i (t, dx) +
∫
|x|≥1
xN i (t, dx) ,
where N˜ i (t, dx) = N i (t, dx)− tρi (dx) is a compensated Poisson random measure
and ρi is a Le´vy measure that satisfies
∫
R
(1 ∧ x2) ρi (dx) <∞.
Remark: In the case studied in [Ha et al., 2009], the noise terms are only
Brownian motions. Here, we assume that each particle has distinct jumps based
on the Levy measure ρi which might lead to the failure of flocking. We will study
this situation in the following section.
In the SCS model with jumps, the velocity of each bird is now influenced by the
environment. Moreover, some birds may speed up dramatically at some moment
in response to the random environmental factors such as the appearance of an
attractive target or by other environmental factors. We provide the definition of
time-asymptotic flocking in [Ha et al., 2009] here:
Definition 2.2. We say there is time-asymptotic flocking for a group of birds if the
position and velocity processes (xit, v
i
t) , i = 1, ..., N, satisfy the follow conditions:
(velocity alignment) lim
t→∞
∣∣E (vit)− E (vjt )∣∣ = 0
(group formation) sup
0≤t<∞
∣∣E (xit)− E (xjt)∣∣ <∞. (2.2)
Note that the SCS model is a nonlinear system and is difficult to analyze
without an explicit form of the communication rate φ. In the next section, with
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a simple explicit form of φ, such as considering φ as a constant, the SCS model
can be reduced to an Ornstein-Uhlenbeck type process which then becomes more
tractable. Moreover, under some boundedness condition on φ, it is also possible
to analyze this nonlinear stochastic system which we will discuss in section 2.4.
2.3.1 Linear communication rate
Assuming that φ = 1, without loss of generality, the SCS model is given by
dvit =
α
N
N∑
j=1
(
vjt − vit
)
dt+ dLit
= α
(
v¯t − vit
)
dt+ dLit
dxit = v
i
tdt, i = 1, ..., N,
(2.3)
where v¯t =
∑N
i=1 v
i
t is defined as the ensemble average and the L
i
t are independent
Le´vy processes for i = 1, ..., N . From the dynamics of the velocity vit, one can
see that each vit is now attracted to ensemble average v¯t which is an Ornstein-
Uhlenbeck Le´vy-type process. In oder to show the stochastic system follows the
flocking criteria (2.2), we follow the analysis in [Ha et al., 2009] where the authors
define the following two variables: ensemble average (macro variable) and the
fluctuations with respect to the ensemble average (micro variable), named (x¯t, v¯t)
and (xˆit, vˆ
i
t) , respectively.
We define
(Macro variable) x¯t =
1
N
N∑
i=1
xit, v¯t =
1
N
N∑
i=1
vit,
(Micro variable) xˆit = x
i
t − x¯t, vˆit = vit − v¯t.
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Note that the micro variable (xˆit, vˆ
i
t) satisfies
1
N
∑N
i=1 xˆ
i
t =
1
N
∑N
i=1 (x
i
t − x¯t) = 0
and 1
N
∑N
i=1 vˆ
i
t = 0. The dynamics for the ensemble average (x¯t, v¯t) are then given
by
dv¯t =
1
N
N∑
i=1
dLit,
dx¯t = v¯tdt,
and the dynamics for the micro variable vˆit are
dvˆit = dv
i
t − dv¯t
=
α
N
N∑
j=1
(
vˆjt − vˆit
)
dt+ dLit −
1
N
N∑
i=1
dLit,
=
[
α
N
N∑
j=1
vˆjt − αvˆit
]
dt+ d
[
Lit −
1
N
N∑
i=1
Lit
]
Since α
N
∑N
j=1 vˆ
j
t =
α
N
∑N
j=1
(
vjt − v¯t
)
= 0, the dynamics for vˆit can be reduced to
dvˆit = −αvˆitdt+ d
[
Lit −
1
N
N∑
i=1
Lit
]
= −αvˆitdt+ dZit ,
where Zit =
(
1− 1
N
)
Lit− 1N
∑N
j 6=i L
j
t , which is a Le´vy-type OU process. Therefore,
the dynamics for the micro variable (xˆit, vˆ
i
t) are given by
dvˆit = −αvˆitdt+ dZit
dxˆit = vˆ
i
tdt.
Note that the processes {Lit, 1 ≤ i ≤ N} are independent, but the processes
{Zit , 1 ≤ i ≤ N} are now correlated through the ensemble noises.
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As investigated in [Sato, 1999], it is easy to check that the solution vˆit with
initial condition vˆi0 is given by
vˆit = e
−αtvˆi0 +
∫ t
0
e−α(t−s)dZit . (2.4)
We now consider the difference defined as vˆi,jt = vˆ
i
t − vˆjt and xˆi,jt = xˆit − xˆjt
,∀i 6= j ∈ {1, ..., N} . Then, we have
vˆi,jt = e
−αtvˆi,j0 +
∫ t
0
e−α(t−s)dLi,js ,
xˆi,jt = xˆ
i,j
0 +
∫ t
0
vˆi,js ds,
(2.5)
where Li,js = L
i
s − Ljs.
Lemma 2.1. Assume that there exists a constant µi ∈ R for all i = 1, ..., N
such that
∫
|x|≥1 xρ
i (dx) = µi < ∞, and let µi,j = µi − µj. We have the following
estimates for xˆi,jt and vˆ
i,j
t :
E
[
vˆi,jt
]
= e−αtE
[
vˆi,j0
]
+
µi,j
α
(
1− e−αt) and
E
[
xˆi,jt
]
= E
[
xˆi,j0
]
+ E
[
vˆi,j0
] (1− e−αt)
α
+ µi,j
[
t
α
+
1
α2
(
e−αt − 1)] .
Proof. By the Le´vy-Ito decomposition, we know that Lit = at+σW
i
t+
∫
|x|<1 xN˜
i (t, dx)+∫
|x|≥1 xN
i (t, dx) . Thus,
Li,js = L
i
s − Ljs
= σ
(
W is −W js
)
+
∫
|x|<1
x
(
N˜ i (t, dx)− N˜ j (t, dx)
)
+
∫
|x|≥1
x
(
N i (t, dx)−N j (t, dx)) .
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Since the first two terms are martingales, we then have
E
(
vˆi,jt
)
= e−αtE
(
vˆi,j0
)
+ E
[∫ t
0
e−α(t−s)
∫
|x|≥1
x
(
N i (ds, dx)−N j (ds, dx))]
= e−αtE
(
vˆi,j0
)
+
∫ t
0
e−α(t−s)ds
(∫
|x|≥1
xρi (dx)−
∫
|x|>1
xρj (dx)
)
= e−αtE
(
vˆi,j0
)
+
1
α
(
1− e−αt)µi,j.
The second estimate directly follows by integrating e−αtE
[
vˆi,j0
]
+ 1
α
(1− e−αt)µi,j.
As we can see from the above lemma, the expectation of the gap process vˆi,jt
depends not only on the initial value, but also on the mean of the jumps µi,j, which
will not converge to zero as time tends to infinity. The term µi,j contributed by
jumps may cause the flocking to fail. In other words, the dynamics of velocity with
distinct jumps will not satisfy definition (2.2) . On the contrary, flocking emerges
in the SCS model (2.3) with identical jumps, i.e., µi = µj as shown in the next
theorem:
Theorem 2.4. Let (xit, v
i
t) be the solutions to (2.3) with µ
i = µj, i 6= j ∈
{1, ..., N} , then we have the time-asymptotic flocking in velocity alignment and
group formation given by
lim
t→∞
∣∣E (vit)− E (vjt )∣∣ = 0,
sup
0≤t<∞
∣∣E (xit)− E (xjt)∣∣ < ∞.
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Proof. With the assumptions on jumps µi = µj, ∀i 6= j ∈ {1, ..., N} , by Lemma
2.1, we have
lim
t→∞
∣∣E (vit)− E (vjt )∣∣ = lim
t→∞
∣∣E (vit − v¯t)− E (vjt − v¯t)∣∣
= lim
t→∞
∣∣E (vˆit)− E (vˆjt )∣∣
= lim
t→∞
∣∣E (vˆi,jt )∣∣
= lim
t→∞
e−αt
∣∣E (vˆi,j0 )∣∣ = 0.
Similarly, we have
∣∣E (xit)− E (xjt)∣∣ = ∣∣E (xit − x¯t)− E (xjt − x¯t)∣∣
=
∣∣E (xˆi,jt )∣∣
≤ ∣∣E (xˆi,j0 )∣∣+ ∣∣E (vˆi,j0 )∣∣ (1− e−αt)α ,
which yields the desired result.
The above theorem indicates that flocking emerges in the SCS model (2.3)
as long as we make some restrictions on jumps. In other words, the jumps for
each particle must be identical, otherwise some particles may move too far away
from the group due to dramatic jumps in velocity, and, therefore, fail to have
group formation and velocity alignment asymptotically. As a result, it is worth
investigating the situation where each particle has only identical jumps, i.e., µi =
µj for all i 6= j. The following theorem focuses only on particles with identical
19
jumps. Assume that the noise terms are identical, i.e.,
E
(
Lit
)
= E
(
Ljt
)
V ar
(
Lit
)
= V ar
(
Ljt
)
,
for all i 6= j ∈ {1, ..., N}.
Theorem 2.5. (Estimate of fluctuation of all particles) For every t ≥ 0, define
the variance of all particles
SN (t) =
1
N − 1
N∑
i=1
(
vit − v¯t
)2
(2.6)
Then, the expectation of SN (t) is given by
E (SN (t)) =
1
N − 1
N∑
i=1
{
e−2αt
(
vˆi0
)2}
+
(1− e−2αt)
2α
var (L1) ,
Furthermore, as t→∞, we have
lim
t→∞
E (SN (t)) =
var (L1)
2α
.
Proof. Recall the solution vˆit = e
−αtvˆi0 +
∫ t
0
e−(t−s)dZit . It is well known that the
characteristic function of vˆit, see details in [Sato, 1999], is given by
φj (θ) = E
(
eiθvˆ
j
t
)
= exp
[
ie−αtvj0θ +
∫ t
0
ψj
(
e−α(t−s)θ
)
ds
]
,
where ψj (θ) = logE
[
eiθZ
j
1
]
. The second moment of vˆit is then obtained by taking
derivative at θ = 0, so we now have
E
[(
vˆit
)2]
=
[
e−αtE
(
vi0
)
+
(1− e−αt)
α
E
(
Zi1
)]2
+
(1− e−2αt)
2α
var
(
Zi1
)
= e−2αt
[
E
(
vi0
)]2
+
(1− e−2αt)
2α
var
(
Zi1
)
,
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since E (Zi1) =
(
1− 1
N
)
E (Li1)− 1N
∑
j 6=iE
(
Lj1
)
= E (Li1)
((
1− 1
N
)− (N−1)
N
)
= 0.
Additionally,
var
(
Zi1
)
= var
[(
1− 1
N
)
Lit −
1
N
∑
j 6=i
Ljt
]
=
[(
1− 1
N
)2
+
(N − 1)
N2
]
var (L1)
=
N − 1
N
var (L1) ,
the asymptotic estimate of variance is then given by
lim
t→∞
E (SN (t)) = lim
t→∞
1
N − 1
N∑
i=1
E
[(
vˆit
)2]
= lim
t→∞
1
N − 1
N∑
i=1
{
e−2αt
[
E
(
vi0
)]2
+
(1− e−2αt)
2α
var
(
Zi1
)}
=
var (L1)
2α
. (2.7)
Remark 2.1. The asymptotic estimate of variance does not depend on the number
of particles N but on the coupling strength α as t→∞.
We provide two concrete examples with numerical results to illustrate the
asymptotic estimate that will tend to a function of coupling strength α.
Example 2.2. (Brownian motions) If Lit = σW
i
t , then the dynamics are given by
dvit =
α
N
N∑
j=1
(
vjt − vit
)
dt+ σdW it , 1 ≤ i ≤ N. (2.8)
Note that these are the dynamics investigated in [Ha et al., 2009]. From (2.7),
we have the asymptotic estimate of the variance
lim
t→∞
E (SN (t)) =
σ2
2α
,
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which is a constant that depends on α. It is worth knowing that although the
system (2.8) satisfies the flocking criteria (2.2), the fluctuation of all particles
might not converge to zero except in the case when the coupling strength α tends
to infinity.
Example 2.3. (Compound Poisson processes) Let
Lit =
Nt∑
j=1
ξj,
where Nt is a Poisson process with intensity λ and the jump sizes {ξj, j ≥ 1} are
i.i.d. random variables with common distribution F ∼ normal(µF , σF ), indepen-
dent of Nt. Thus, the mean and variance of L
i
t are given by E (Lit) = λtµF and
var (Lit) = λtE
(
ξ2j
)
= λt (σ2F + µ
2
F ) . The asymptotic estimate of the variance is
then given by
lim
t→∞
E (SN (t)) =
λ (σ2F + µ
2
F )
2α
.
From the above example, we see that the asymptotic estimate of the variance
tends to a function of not only in α but also in the parameters λ, µF and σF .
Both examples may have the same asymptotic variance under some parameters
settings which we show in the following figures.
We simulate the linear SCS model (2.3) in both examples 2.2 and 2.3 by
employing an Euler scheme with time dividend ∆t = 0.0001 and illustrate the
effect of coupling strength α. In Figure 2.1 with smaller coupling strength, for
instance α = 1, we see that the flocking is not obvious while the asymptotic
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variance in both examples tend to the same theoretical value 0.5 with parameters
T = 10, λ = 1, µF = 0 and σF = σ = 1 as shown in Figure 2.3. In Figure 2.2,
both asymptotic variances tend to zero with large coupling strength, α = 100,
and the flocking emerges in both systems.
Figure 2.1: The velocity plots of both with Brownian motions, compound Poisson
processes and the fluctuation. With smaller coupling strength α = 1, flocking is
not obvious while the asymptotic variances in both examples tend to the same
theoretical value λ
2α
(σ2F + µ
2
F ) = 0.5. The parameters used: N = 100, T = 10,
λ = 1, µF = 0, σF = σ = 1.
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Figure 2.2: The velocity plots of both with Brownian motions, compound Poisson
processes and the fluctuation. With larger coupling strength α = 100, flocking
is obvious while the asymptotic variances in both examples tend to the same
theoretical value λ
2α
(σ2F + µ
2
F ) ≈ 0. The parameters used: N = 100, T = 10,
λ = 1, µF = 0, σF = σ = 1.
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Figure 2.3: The fluctuation plot of both with Brownian motions, compound Pois-
son processes and the fluctuation. The parameters used: T = 1, λ = 1, µF = 0,
σF = σ = 1.
2.3.2 Radially symmetric communication rate
In this section, we follow the analysis in [Ha et al., 2009] for which the noise
terms are now driven by Le´vy processes. When the communication rate func-
tion satisfies some boundedness conditions, we also give the upper bound for the
estimate of the variance of all particles that we define in (2.6) .
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Assume that ψ is a non-increasing function in its argument and depends only
on the distance between particles, i.e.,
ψ = ψ¯
(|xj − xi|2) .
Then (2.1) can be rewritten as
dxit = v
i
tdt
dvit =
α
N
N∑
j=1
ψ¯
(|xj − xi|2) (vjt − vit) dt+ dLit, 1 ≤ i ≤ N. (2.9)
By using the assumption of symmetric and translation invariance for the commu-
nication rate, we may write the dynamics for the micro variables (xˆit, vˆ
i
t) as
dvit =
α
N
N∑
j=1
ψ¯
(∣∣xˆjt − xˆit∣∣2) (vˆjt − vˆit) dt+ dZit ,
dxˆit = vˆ
i
tdt,
where Zit =
(
1− 1
N
)
Lit − 1N
∑N
j 6=i L
j
t .
Recall that the variance is given by
SN (t) =
1
N − 1
N∑
i=1
(
vˆit
)2
.
We need an auxiliary function to obtain an upper bound for E [SN (t)] . Define
χ (t) =
N∑
i=1
(
xˆit
)2
.
Observe that ∣∣xˆjt − xˆit∣∣2 ≤ 2χ (t)
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and since ψ¯ is non-increasing, we have
ψ¯
(∣∣xˆjt − xˆit∣∣2) ≥ ψ¯ (2χ (t)) .
We now give the boundedness of E [SN (t)] in the following theorem:
Theorem 2.6. Assume that ψ¯ satisfies the lower bound condition
min
s>0
ψ¯ (s) ≥ ψ∗ > 0,
for some constant ψ∗. Then, the estimate of the variance SN (t) is bounded in t
and depends on the distribution of jump size of vit. Specifically, we have
E [SN (t)] ≤ e−2ψ∗αtSN (0)+ σ
2
2ψ∗α
(
1− e−2ψ∗αt)+ 1
N − 1e
−2ψ∗αt
N∑
i=1
∑
0≤s≤t
e2ψ
∗αsE
(
∆vˆis
)2
.
Proof. Firstly, we derive the dynamics for SN (t) by using the Ito formula for Le´vy
processes and by changing index i↔ j.
dSN (t) =
1
N − 1
N∑
i=1
d
(
vˆit
)2
=
1
N − 1
N∑
i=1
{
2vˆitdv
i
t + d
[
vˆit, vˆ
i
t
]c
t
+
(
vˆit
)2 − (yˆit−)2 − 2vˆit−∆vˆit}
=
1
N − 1
N∑
i=1
{
2vˆitdv
i
t + σ
2
(
1− 1
N
)
dt+
(
∆vˆit
)2}
=
1
N − 1
N∑
i=1
2vˆit
(
α
N
N∑
j=1
ψ¯
(∣∣xˆjt − xˆit∣∣2) (vˆjt − vˆit) dt+ dZit
)
+σ2dt+
1
N − 1
N∑
i=1
(
∆vˆit
)2
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=
−2
N − 1
N∑
i=1
vjt
(
α
N
N∑
j=1
ψ¯
(∣∣xˆjt − xˆit∣∣2) (vˆjt − vˆit) dt
)
+
1
N − 1
N∑
i=1
2vˆitdZ
i
t
+σ2dt+
1
N − 1
N∑
i=1
(
∆yˆ
(i)
t
)2
≤ −ψ¯ (2χ (t))
N − 1
α
N
N∑
i=1
N∑
j=1
2vˆjt
(
vˆjt − vˆit
)
dt+
1
N − 1
N∑
i=1
2vˆitdZ
(i)
t
+σ2dt+
1
N − 1
N∑
i=1
(
∆vˆit
)2
=
−ψ¯ (2χ (t))α
N − 1
N∑
j=1
2
(
vˆjt
)2
dt+
1
N − 1
N∑
i=1
2vˆitdZ
(i)
t
+σ2dt+
1
N − 1
N∑
i=1
(
∆vˆit
)2
≤ −2ψ∗αSN (t) dt+ 1
N − 1
N∑
i=1
2vˆitdZ
(i)
t + σ
2dt+
1
N − 1
N∑
i=1
(
∆vˆit
)2
.
In order to obtain the upper bound, we then apply Ito’s formula again to the
function e2ψ
∗αtSN (t) . Thus,
de2ψ
∗αtSN (t) = 2ψ
∗αe2ψ
∗αtSN (t) dt+ e
2ψ∗αtdSN (t)
+e2ψ
∗αtSN (t)− e2ψ∗αt−SN
(
t−
)− e2ψ∗αt−∆SN (t)
= 2ψ∗αe2ψ
∗αtSN (t) dt+ e
2ψ∗αtdSN (t)
≤ 2ψ∗αe2ψ∗αtSN (t) dt
+e2ψ
∗αt

−2ψ∗αSN (t) dt+ 1N−1
∑N
i=1 2yˆ
i
tdZ
i
t + σ
2dt
+ 1
N−1
∑N
i=1 (∆yˆ
i
t)
2

= e2ψ
∗αt
{
1
N − 1
N∑
i=1
2yˆitdZ
i
t + σ
2dt+
1
N − 1
N∑
i=1
(
∆yˆit
)2}
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Then we integrate with respect to t to get
SN (t) ≤ e−2ψ∗αtSN (0) + 2
N − 1
N∑
i=1
∫ t
0
e−2ψ
∗α(t−s)vˆisdZ
i
s +
σ2
2ψ∗α
(
1− e−2ψ∗αt)
+
1
N − 1e
−2ψ∗αt
N∑
i=1
∑
0≤s≤t
e2ψ
∗αs (∆vˆis)2 .
Finally, we take the ensemble average to obtain
E [SN (t)] ≤ e−2ψ∗αtSN (0)+ σ
2
2ψ∗α
(
1− e−2ψ∗αt)+ 1
N − 1e
−2ψ∗αt
N∑
i=1
∑
0≤s≤t
e2ψ
∗αsE
(
∆vˆis
)2
,
since E
[∫ t
0
e−2ψ
∗α(t−s)vˆisdZ
i
s
]
= 0 by the Le´vy-Ito decomposition and the martin-
gale argument.
It is difficult to prove when the nonlinear system (2.9) satisfies the flocking
criteria (2.2) . However, the above theorem provides a different perspective on
flocking by investigating the fluctuation of all particles. Flocking will emerge in
such systems as long as the rate α is large enough under some boundedness of
communication rate ψ. Specifically, the fluctuation of all particles will decrease
exponentially with large α despite the lack of flocking criteria (2.2) .
2.3.3 Numerical results
In this section, we simulate the linear SCS model (2.3) by employing an Eu-
ler scheme with time dividend ∆t = 0.0001 and illustrate the effect of coupling
strength α as well as jumps. Assuming the noise terms in (2.3) is given by
Lit = σW
i
t +
∑N it
j=1 ξj , where ξj has distribution f (y; θ) =
θ
2
e−|y|θ, θ > 0 and N it is
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a Poisson process with rate λ. We use the parameters N = 10, T = 1, σ = 1, θ = 1
and λ = 3 to illustrate the model. For the purpose of simplification, we only
provide the plots for the position of all particles. Note that Figure 2.4 to Figure
2.7 show the trajectories of the model (2.3) in space (with 3-dimensional noises
terms).
In both Figure 2.4 and Figure 2.5, it is obvious that the flocking does not
emerge for a small coupling strengh, α = 1. Additionally, as shown in blue line
in Figure 2.4, a particle only changes its position due to a sudden jump in its
velocity part, whereas the blue line shows no obvious change in course in Figure
2.5.
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Figure 2.4: Plot of 3-dimensional position for the model (2.3) with one particular
jump (blue line). Flocking does not emerge for a small coupling strengh, α = 1,
since the failure of group formation. The parameters used: σ = 1, θ = 1 and
λ = 3.
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Figure 2.5: Plot of 3-dimensional position for the model (2.3) without any jumps.
Compare to Figure 2.4, the blue line shows no obvious change in course.
In Figure 2.6 and Figure 2.7, flocking emerges in the SCS model for larger
coupling strength α = 100 regardless the presence of jumps. Figure 2.6 shows
flocking with jumps where jumps might be considered as a characteristic of a
leading particle (i.e. the blue line) who has a faster or lower velocity than other
particles in the group. Everyone else follows the trajectory of this leading particle
in Figure 2.6. In contrast, every particle is moving around closely to each other
without jumps in Figure 2.7.
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Figure 2.6: Plot of 3-dimensional position for the model (2.3) with one particular
jump (blue line). Flocking emerges in the SCS model for larger coupling strength
α = 100 regardless of the presence of jumps. Everyone else (red lines) follows the
trajectory of this particular particle (blue line). The parameters used: N = 10,
T = 1, σ = 1, θ = 1 and λ = 3.
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Figure 2.7: Plot of 3-dimensional position for the model (2.3) without any jumps.
Compare to Figure 2.6, the blue line shows no dramatic change in course and
every particle is moving around closely to each other without jumps.
In the following two figures, we provide a one dimensional plot for both po-
sitions and velocities to better describe the jump phenomenon. As we can see
in Figure 2.8, there is a negative jump around time 0.6. Compared to the ve-
locity plot in Figure 2.9, it shows that the velocity of a particular particle (blue
line) decreases suddenly around time 0.6 and then is attracted to the rest of the
group. While the corresponding position of this particle is affected and is moving
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out of the group slightly, the rest of the group is still attracted to its trajectory.
Therefore, we may consider this particle as a leading particle.
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Figure 2.8: Plot of one-dimensional position, a negative jump presents around
time 0.6. The parameters used: N = 10, T = 1, σ = 1, θ = 1 and λ = 3.
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Figure 2.9: The corresponding velocity of a particular particle (blue line) decreases
suddenly around time 0.6. The parameters used are the same as Figure 2.8.
2.4 Stochastic flocking model with a central par-
ticle
In the previous sections, we did not take into account the interactions between
individual particles and one central particle in a stochastic system. Within the
new system, all particles now communicate with each other indirectly through a
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central particle. The central particle is now playing an important role as it acts
as an intermediary to bring all particles into communication.
In this section, we propose a new model that would capture the interactions
between individual particles and the central particle. For the simplicity of analysis,
we consider the noise terms in the dynamics are driven by Brownian motions only
but can easily be extended to Le´vy processes. We consider a particle (x0t , v
0
t ) as
the central particle with dynamics:
dv0t =
α
N
N∑
j=1
φ
(
xjt , x
0
t
) (
vjt − v0t
)
dt+ σ0dW
0
t ,
dx0t = v
0
t dt,
while the other individual particles, called peripheral particles, have dynamics
dvit = βφ
(
x0t , x
i
t
) (
v0t − vit
)
dt+ σidW
i
t
dxit = v
i
tdt, i = 1, ..., N,
where α, β ≥ 0 are the coupling strength and φ ≥ 0 is the communication rate as
we defined earlier in this chapter.
From the above dynamics, we observe that individual peripheral particles com-
municate with each other only through the communication rate φ (x0t , x
i
t) with the
central particle x0t . In other words, the closer the peripheral particle x
i
t is to the
central particle x0t , the stronger communication rate x
i
t will be. We again assume
that the initial condition (xi0, v
i
0) = (x0, v0), for i = 0, 1, .., N. We will also prove
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that such stochastic systems have the time-asymptotic flocking as in the case of
linear communication rate.
We consider a constant communication rate φ = 1. Hence, the dynamics read
as
dv0T =
α
N
N∑
j=1
(
vjt − v0t
)
dt+ σ0dW
0
t
dvit = β
(
v0t − vit
)
dt+ σIdW
i
t
dxit = v
i
tdt, i = 0, 1, ..., N
(2.10)
Define the ensemble average v¯t =
1
N
∑N
j=1 v
j
t and then we have the dynamics
of v¯t to be
dv¯t = β
(
v0t − v¯t
)
dt+
1
N
N∑
i=1
σidW
i
t .
Our goal is to show that vit will satisfy the time-asymptotic flocking criteria
lim
t→∞
∣∣E (vit)− E (vjt )∣∣ = 0, for i 6= j ∈ {0, ..., N} .
We consider the micro and macro decomposition again and recall that the micro
variable is defined as vˆit = v
i
t − v¯t for i = 0, 1, ..., N. First of all, we investigate the
micro variable only for i = 1, .., N ; the dynamics are given by
dvˆit = β
(
v0t − vit
)
dt+ σidW
i
t − β
(
v0t − v¯t
)
dt− 1
N
N∑
i=1
σidW
i
t
= −β (vit − v¯t)+ σi(1− 1N
)
dW it +
1
N
N∑
j 6=i
σjdW
j
t
= −βXˆ it + dZit ,
where Zit = σi
(
1− 1
N
)
W it +
1
N
∑N
j 6=i σjW
j
t .
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Since vˆit is an OU process with mean reverting rate β, and it is easy to check
that the solution vˆit are given by
vˆit = e
−βtvˆi0 +
∫ t
0
e−β(t−s)dZis, i = 1, .., N,
we have the estimate
E
(
vˆit
)
= e−βtE
(
vˆi0
)
= 0.
Secondly, we see that the dynamic of the micro variable for i = 0 is given by
dvˆ0t = dv
0
t − dv¯t
= α
(
v¯t − v0t
)
dt+ σ0dW
0
t − β
(
v0t − v¯t
)
dt− 1
N
N∑
i=1
σidW
i
t
= − (α + β) (v0t − v¯t) dt+ σ0dW 0t − 1N
N∑
i=1
σidW
i
t
= − (α + β) vˆ0t dt+ dZ0t ,
where Z0t = σ0W
0
t − 1N
∑N
i=1 σiW
i
t . The solution is, again, given by
vˆ0t = e
−(α+β)tvˆ00 +
∫ t
0
e−(α+β)(t−s)dZ0s ,
and, also, we have the estimate
E
(
vˆ0t
)
= e−(α+β)tE
(
vˆ00
)
.
We now know the particles (xit, v
i
t) have time-asymptotic flocking by the following
theorem:
Theorem 2.7. Let (xit, v
i
t) be the solutions to (2.10) for i 6= j ∈ {0, 1, ..., N} , we
then have
lim
t→∞
∣∣E (vit)− E (vjt )∣∣ = 0.
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Furthermore,
sup
0≤t<∞
∣∣E (xit)− E (xjt)∣∣ <∞.
Proof. By a similar argument shown in the previous section, we would have for
i 6= j ∈ {1, .., N}
lim
t→∞
∣∣E (vit)− E (vjt )∣∣ = lim
t→∞
e−at
∣∣E (vˆi0 − vˆj0)∣∣ = 0.
In addition, for i = {1, ..., N}, we have
lim
t→∞
∣∣E (v0t )− E (vjt )∣∣ = lim
t→∞
∣∣E (v0t − v¯t)− E (vjt − v¯t)∣∣
= lim
t→∞
∣∣E (vˆ0t )− E (vˆjt )∣∣
= lim
t→∞
∣∣e−(α+β)tE (vˆ00)− e−βtE (vˆi0)∣∣
= lim
t→∞
∣∣e−(α+β)tE (vˆ00)− e−βtE (vˆi0)∣∣
≤ lim
t→∞
e−(α+β)t
∣∣E (vˆ00)∣∣+ e−βt ∣∣E (vˆi0)∣∣
= 0.
The above theorem provides us the fact that flocking still emerges even in such
stochastic particle systems with a central particle. We will apply this result to
further characterize systemic risk in Chapter 5. The particle dynamics studied in
this chapter will represent the dynamics of log-monetary reserves of banks later
in Chapter 3 and will use this time-asymptotic flocking result.
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Chapter 3
Systemic risk with jumps
3.1 Systemic risk model
Systemic risk is the risk of financial system instability or failure that may occur
under certain circumstances and can sometimes led to catastrophic consequences
to the interconnected financial system. Many researchers have investigated sys-
temic risk and its impact on the banking market [Bo and Capponi, 2013], [Fouque
and Ichiba, 2013], [Fouque and sun, 2013], [Garnier et al., 2012]. In [Fouque and
Ichiba, 2013], the authors analyze systemic risk in interbank lending systems by
modeling monetary reserves of banks as a system of interacting Feller diffusions.
Their model demonstrates that growth rate and lending preference are key fac-
tors in understanding systemic risk in an interbank lending system. In [Fouque
and Sun, 2013], the authors propose a simpler system with log-monetary reserves
of N banks where the rates of borrowing\lending between individual banks are
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proportional to the difference between their log-monetary reserves. They further
define systemic risk as the risk that all banks will be in default simultaneously for
a given horizon time.
In this chapter, we aim to extend the model proposed in [Fouque and Sun, 2013]
and establish a mathematical model to characterize the banking system and the
effect on the systemic risk when each bank is exposed to the possibility of having
instantaneous shock or sudden bankruptcy that we identify as jumps. To get a
more in-depth understanding of systemic risk that may help us to navigate and
further prevent such event, we propose an interbank borrowing and lending model
that allows sudden increase or decrease in individual bank reserve to illustrate a
systemic risk by using a stochastic flocking system described in Chapter 2.
We consider a system of N banks with log-monetary reserves interacting with
each other through interbank borrowing and lending. We assume that, for i =
1, .., N , the log-monetary reserves of the ith bank satisfies the following dynamics
dX it =
α
N
N∑
j=1
(
Xjt −X it
)
dt+ dLit, (3.1)
where α ≥ 0 is defined as the rate of borrowing or lending to each other. For
i = 1, ..., N, the processes Lit are independent and one-dimensional Le´vy processes
with generating triplet (a, σ, ρi) . We assume that the initial log-monetary reserves
X i0 is zero. The overall rate of mean-reversion
α
N
is normalized by the number
of banks. Moreover, the drift term indicates the interaction between the reserves
of bank i and bank j. For bank i with reserve X it , it will borrow from bank j
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if X it < X
j
t and lend to bank j if X
i
t > X
j
t . Note that this is the case of linear
communication rate in the SCS model where we regard the velocity as the log-
monetary reserve. As a result, we can expect that flocking emerges whenever the
rate α is large or in the long run. In the sense of this banking system, for each
bank i, the log-monetary reserve X it will be almost the same as long as there
are more interbank activities, i.e., the rate of borrowing or lending is large. It is
shown in [Fouque and Sun, 2013] that increasing the rate will not only increases
the stability of this banking system but also systemic risk.
As stated in [Fouque and Sun, 2013], in order to study the systemic risk, we
first define the first default time for bank i as
τi = inf
{
t ≥ 0;X it ≤ η
}
, η < 0.
We are interested in the event that all banks will be in default simultaneously for
a given horizon time T . Therefore, we investigate the joint probability that
P (τi ≤ T, i = 1, ..., N) = P
(
min
0≤s≤T
X is ≤ η, i = 1, ..., N
)
. (3.2)
According to the literature [Di Crescenzo et al., 1995], it is difficult to compute
the joint probability explicitly even when N = 2. It is even more complicated to
find this probability in a high dimensional banking system with interacting drift
terms.
However, within the special structured system where noise terms are driven
by particular processes, we will be able to compute the joint probability (3.2)
43
approximately by the behavior of flocking, which will be discussed in section
3.3. In the following section, we investigate the mean-field limit in this interbank
lending system.
3.2 Mean-field limit
To understand system (3.1) , we rewrite the dynamics as
dX it =
α
N
N∑
j=1
(
Xjt −X it
)
dt+ dLit
= α
[
1
N
N∑
j=1
Xjt −X it
]
dt+ dLit, i = 1, ..., N.
Observe that processes X it are now Le´vy-type OU processes which mean-revert
to the ensemble average X¯t =
1
N
∑N
j=1X
j
t , which indicates that X¯t approximately
leads the entire banking system. Moreover, by taking the average, the ensemble
average X¯t satisfies
dX¯t =
1
N
N∑
i=1
dLit.
Recall that X i0 = 0, for i = 1, ..., N ; we then have X¯t =
1
N
∑N
i=1 L
i
t, and so
dX it = α
[
1
N
N∑
i=1
Lit −X it
]
dt+ dLit.
The solution X it is given by
X it =
1
N
N∑
i=1
Lit + e
−αt
∫ t
0
eαsdLis −
1
N
N∑
j=1
e−αt
∫ t
0
eαsdLjs.
Note that the ensemble average is still a Le´vy process.
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As N →∞, the strong law of large numbers gives
1
N
N∑
i=1
Lit → γ ≡ E
(
L1t
)
= t
(
a+
∫
|x|≥1
xρ (dx)
)
a.s.,
and therefore (X it)
′
s converges to independent Le´vy-type OU processes(
a+
∫
|x|≥1
xρ (dx)
)(
1− 1− e
−αt
α
)
+ e−αt
∫ t
0
eαsdLis
with long-run mean γ. In fact, this is a simple example of a mean-field limit and
propagation of chaos studied in [Sznitman, 1991]. In conclusion, getting more
banks involved in this lending system will make the system more complicated
intuitively; however, the banks will eventually act independently.
3.3 Systemic risk illustrated with jump diffusion
processes
The stability of this interbank system with coupled diffusions has been il-
lustrated in [Fouque and Sun, 2013], the authors show that more interactivities
between individual banks will not only create stability but also systemic risk. In
this section, we aim to extend their result by adding jumps which can be regarded
as optimistic news or sudden bankruptcy.
We assume that, for i = 1, .., N , the log-monetary reserves of the ith bank
satisfies the following dynamics:
dX it =
α
N
N∑
j=1
(
Xjt −X it
)
dt+ dLit, (3.3)
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where α is defined as the rate of borrowing and lending. The processes Lit = σW
i
t +∑N it
j=1 ξj are one-dimensional jump diffusion processes, where W
i
t are independent
Brownian motions, σ > 0, jump sizes ξj have distribution f (y; θ) =
θ
2
e−|y|θ, θ > 0
and N it are Poisson processes independent of W
i
t , with intensity parameter λ. We
assume that the initial log-monetary reserves X i0 = 0. The parameter σ is the
volatility of Brownian motions, while the parameters θ and λ are described as the
strength and the frequency of instantaneous shock, respectively.
To understand the systemic risk, we now investigate the joint default prob-
ability (3.2) , i.e., how many banks have reached the default level η < 0 before
t = 1. In order to illustrate the systemic risk in this setting, we assume the de-
fault level η = −0.7. Define {default event} = {min0≤t≤1X it ≤ η, 1 ≤ i ≤ N} and
K ≡ {# of default} . We are interested in the loss distribution
p = P (K = k) , where k = 0, 1..., N.
We aim to know the probability that all banks will be in default simultaneously
before t = 1, i.e., K = N ; however, such probability is difficult to obtain explicitly.
Alternatively, we compute this probability numerically through simulations to
illustrate the systemic risk. We simulate 104 trajectories for the dynamics (3.3)
by employing an Euler scheme with time dividend ∆t = 0.0001 and illustrate the
effect of rate α as well as jumps. Below, we provide figures for the loss distribution
in both coupled diffusions and jump diffusions for α = 1, indicating weak interbank
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lending activities, and for α = 100, indicating strong interbank lending activities.
These figures also show one realization of the trajectories for different values α.
In Figure 3.1 , we assume that the noise terms in (3.3) are driven by Brow-
nian motions and when α = 1, the model appears to be driven by independent
Brownian motions. Thus, the chance that the log-monetary reserve of each bank
i will be in default before t = 1, i.e., {min0≤t≤1X it ≤ −0.7} , is equally likely.
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Figure 3.1: Plots of trajectories for the model (3.3) with Brownian motions (upper
one) and the corresponding loss distribution (bottom one) in a fixed time t = 1.
Weak flocking for α = 1 in the upper one; the model appears to be driven by
independent Brownian motions. The parameters used: N = 10, σ = 1 and
η = −0.7..
The loss distribution is shown as a Binomial distribution (N, p) , N = 10,
p ≈ P {min0≤t≤1X it ≤ −0.7} . In addition, the default probability can be computed
in general for α = 0 with the initial reserve X i0 = 0 and noise terms L
i
t = σW
i
t in
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(3.3) . We conclude that
p = P
{
min
0≤t≤T
X it ≤ η
}
= P
{
min
0≤t≤T
Lit ≤ η
}
= P
{
min
0≤t≤T
σW it ≤ η
}
= 2Φ
(
η
σ
√
T
)
,
where Φ denotes the cdf of N (0, 1) and we use the distribution of the first passage
time for Brownian motion, which will be shown in section 3.3.1.
In Figure 3.2, we see that the loss distribution corresponds to either no default
or all defaults. It appears that the fat tail corresponds to the small probability
of the ensemble average reaching the default level, and to almost all diffusions
following this average due to flocking behavior for large α. The authors in [Fouque
and Sun, 2013] identify this small probability as a ”systemic risk” probability
which can be obtained by the distribution of the first passage time of Brownian
motions due to flocking in this stable system.
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Figure 3.2: Plots of trajectories for the model (3.3) with Brownian motions (upper
one) and the corresponding loss distribution (bottom one) in a fixed time t = 1.
Compare to Figure 3.1, flocking emerges for α = 100 in the upper one and the
loss distribution corresponding to either no default or all defaults. The parameters
used: N = 10, σ = 1 and η = −0.7.
We next illustrate the effect of jumps on the systemic risk through another
simulation using a model with jump diffusions shown in Figure 3.3. We simulate
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the model in (3.3):
dX it =
α
N
N∑
j=1
(
Xjt −X it
)
dt+ dLit,
where α is defined as the rate of borrowing and lending. The processes Lit = σW
i
t +∑N it
j=1 ξj are one-dimensional jump diffusion processes, where W
i
t are independent
Brownian motions, σ > 0, jump sizes ξj have distribution f (y; θ) =
θ
2
e−|y|θ, θ > 0
and N it are Poisson processes independent of W
i
t , with intensity parameter λ.
In Figure 3.3, we obtain a higher probability that all banks will be in default
before t = 1. Note that θ = 1 means we have a greater chance that one of the
banks will reach the default η = −0.7. As a result, in the jump diffusion model with
double exponential jump size, we obtain a similar result as the Brownian motion
case but higher probability on the fat tail. Observe that the small probability,
i.e., systemic risk increases and so does the risk of individual banks, that is, the
probability that one bank will be in default.
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Figure 3.3: Plot of trajectories for the model (3.3) with jump-diffusion noises
as well as the corresponding loss distribution in a fixed time t = 1. Note that
the upper one is just one realization of the model (3.3), flocking still emerges for
α = 100 according to the analysis in section 2.3. The parameters used: N = 10,
σ = 1, θ = 1 and λ = 1.
In [Fouque and Sun, 2013], the authors identify
{
min0≤t≤T X¯t ≤ η
}
as a sys-
temic event in a coupled diffusion model. We now focus on the event where the
ensemble average X¯t =
1
N
∑N
i=1 L
i
t reaches the default level η < 0. The probability
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that this event, which we call systemic risk, can be written as follows:
P
(
min
0≤t≤T
X¯t ≤ η
)
= P
(
min
0≤t≤T
1
N
N∑
i=1
Lit ≤ η
)
. (3.4)
Note that this probability might only be computed explicitly under certain
situations (see [ Kou and Wang, 2003] and [Novikov et al, 2003]) such as when
Lit is a Brownian motion, only possesses one-sided jumps or there is some special
distribution for the jump size.
3.3.1 First passage time for Brownian motions
For searching the distribution of the first passage, we define τb = inf {t ≥ 0;Lt ≥ b} ,
b > 0. It is well known that, if Lt = Wt, the Laplace transform of τb is then given
by, for s ∈ (0,∞) ,
E
[
e−sτb
]
= e−b
√
2s.
Moreover, the density function of τb is given by
fτb (t) =
b√
2pi
t−
3
2 e−
b2
2t , t ≥ 0.
In terms of (3.4) , let Lit = σW
i
t . Then the probability can be computed
explicitly as
P
(
min
0≤t≤T
1
N
N∑
i=1
Lit ≤ η
)
= P
(
min
0≤t≤T
σ
N
N∑
i=1
W it ≤ η
)
= P
(
min
0≤t≤T
W˜t ≤ η
√
N
σ
)
= 2Φ
(
η
√
N
σT
)
,
(3.5)
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by a change of measure, by the reflection principle or by computing the Laplace
transform through some appropriate martingale and the optional stopping theo-
rem. Here, W˜t is a standard Brownian motion.
3.3.2 First passage time for jump-diffusion processes
If Lt is a jump-diffusion process, there are some difficulties for finding the
distribution of the first passage time depending on the structure of jumps. The
intuition is given as follows:
• Without a jump part, the distribution of the first passage time can be ob-
tained by the reflection principle or by calculating the Laplace transform
via some appropriate martingale and optional sampling theorem.
• With a jump part, it is difficult to find the distribution of the first pas-
sage time since the process may hit the boundary exactly or it incurs an
”overshoot”, Lτb − b, over the boundary.
• The overshoot presents many problems.
1. We have to know the exact distribution of the overshoot,
i.e, P (Lτb − b = 0) and P (Lτb − b > x) for x > 0.
2. We need to know the dependent structure between the overshoot Lτb−b
and the first passage time τb.
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3. If we want to use the reflection principle, the dependent structure be-
tween the overshoot and the terminal value of Lt is needed.
However, the special case that the size of jump is double-exponentially dis-
tributed has been solved in [Kou and Wang, 2003]. We state the important results
needed for systemic risk in what follows.
Let Lit be a jump-diffusion process with double-exponentially distributed jump
sizes, i.e.,
Lit = σW
i
t +
N it∑
j=1
ξj, (3.6)
where N it is a Poisson process with intensity rate λ > 0 and {ξj, j ≥ 1} are
i.i.d. random variables with common distribution
f (y; θ) =
θ
2
e−|y|θ, θ > 0.
For all u ∈ C2, the infinitesimal generator of Lit is given by
Lu (x) = 1
2
σ2x2u
′′
(x) + λ
∫
R
[u (x+ y)− u (x)] fξ (y) dy.
Moreover, assume that z ∈ (−θ, θ) . The moment generating function of Lt is
given by
E
[
ezLt
]
= exp {G (z) t} ,
where G (x) ≡ 1
2
σ2x2+λ
(
θ2
θ2−x2 − 1
)
. Then the Laplace transform of P (τb ≤ T ) =
P (max0≤t≤T Lt ≥ b) is given by the following theorem:
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Theorem [Kou and Wang, 2003]. For any s ∈ (0,∞) , let β1 and β2 be
the only two positive roots of the equation
s = G (β) ,
where 0 < β1 < θ < β2 <∞. Then the Laplace transform of τb is given by
E
[
e−sτb
]
=
θ − β1
θ
β2
β2 − β1 e
−bβ1 +
β2 − θ
θ
β1
β2 − β1 e
−bβ2 .
Remark 3.1. See Theorem 3.1 in [Kou and Wang, 2003] for the general case
if interested, i.e., f (y; θ) = pθ1e
−yθ11 {y ≥ 0} + qθ2eyθ21 {y < 0} , θ1, θ2 > 0 and
p+ q = 1.
Back to the systemic risk (3.4) , the probability is given by
P
(
min
0≤t≤T
1
N
N∑
i=1
Lit ≤ η
)
= P
(
max
0≤t≤T
1
N
N∑
i=1
Lit ≥ b
)
, where b = −η.
= P
(
max
0≤t≤T
N∑
i=1
Lit ≥ Nb
)
= P
(
max
0≤t≤T
L˜t ≥ Nb
)
= P (τNb ≤ T ) ,
(3.7)
where L˜t = σ˜Wt +
∑N˜t
j=1 ξj, σ˜ =
√
Nσ and N˜t is a Poisson process with rate
λ˜ = Nλ.
By using the above theorem and the inverse Laplace transform, we can there-
fore obtain the numerical result of the probability (3.7) . As stated in [Kou and
Wang, 2003], the Gaver-Stehfest algorithm by [Gaver, 1966] and [Stehfest, 1970]
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is a crucial method since it is the only algorithm that can deal with the inversion
on the real line. Alternatively, one may see [Abate and Whitt, 1992] for more
details about Laplace inversion algorithms. The algorithm is described as follows:
For any bounded real-valued function f on [0,∞) and continuous at t we have
that
f (t) = lim
n→∞
f˜n (t) ,
where fn (t) =
ln(2)
t
(2n)!
n!(n−1)!
∑n
k=0 (−1)k
(
n
k
)
fˆ
(
(n+ k) ln(2)
t
)
and fˆ is the Laplace
transform of f. Since the explicit form of fˆ is given in the previous theorem, we
will now be able to compute the distributions of the first passage times for the
double exponential jump diffusion process and thus the systemic risk probability
(3.4) with (3.6) can be computed numerically.
It is worth discussing (3.4) for a Le´vy process Lt; however, finding an explicit
formula for the distribution of the first hitting time for a Le´vy process is quite
difficult. According to [Kou and Wang, 2003], the only case of an explicit formula,
so far, is the jump diffusion with double exponential jump size. Problem (3.4) can
be solved either through a martingale approach or an integral equation approach,
see [Hadjiev, 1985], [Novikov, 1981]. In addition, see [Novikov et al., 2003] for a
survey of the first hitting time problems of compound Poisson processes. More-
over, in [Braverman, 2009] the author provides an asymptotic probability for (3.4)
as N →∞ that may help us to see the systemic risk in the general case.
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At the end of this section, we provide the plot for the probability that the
ensemble average reaches the default barrier on both models for different number
of banks N given in Figure 3.4.
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Figure 3.4: Plot of systemic risk probability for different number of banks with
both Brownian motions and jump diffusions. The probability that the ensemble
average reaches the default level η = −0.7 for both Brownian motions and jump
diffusions decreases as N increases.
One can observe in Figure 3.4 that, compared to systemic risk with Brownian
motions, the systemic risk probability is higher with jump diffusion processes
and decays to 0 slower as N increases. Note that in [Fouque and Sun, 2013], the
authors show the probability that the ensemble average reaches the default barrier
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is of order exp
(
− η2N
2σ2T
)
by the theory of large deviations when Lt is a Brownian
motion.
To conclude this chapter, we see that including jumps in the dynamic of re-
serve processes increases not only the systemic risk but also the risk of individual
banks. However, the model with jumps provides more flexibility by including
more parameters such as intensity rates λ and jump sizes θ, for the purpose of
calibration. In April 2015, China’s central bank made a huge reduction in the
amount of cash that banks must hold in reserves in order to add liquidity to help
stimulate bank lending and fight slowing growth. This kind of dramatic change
can be regarded as a sudden jump in the reserve processes that will expose the
entire banking system to a higher risk environment. Making some slight changes
in the reserve is reasonable and acceptable in a stable banking system such as
studied in [Fouque and Sun, 2013] but might not be a good idea with dramatic
changes (jumps) since it may result in a higher systemic risk.
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Chapter 4
Stochastic differential games with
jumps and systemic risk
In this chapter, we integrate a game feature with jumps, where each bank
controls its rate of borrowing/lending with a central bank. We will use game
theory and stochastic optimal control with jump-diffusion processes to analyze
the impact of jumps to our interbank borrowing and lending model. We will solve
a feedback equilibrium with jumps in game theory—Nash equilibria—with finitely
many banks using both an FBSDE approach and an HJB approach in section 4.2.
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4.1 Stochastic optimal control with jump-diffusion
processes
In this section, we give some background and concepts related to stochastic
optimal control with jump-diffusion processes. There are typically two ways to
solve an optimal control problem: one way is through dynamic programming with
corresponding HJB equations [Framstad et al, 1998] and the other approach is
by using maximum principle [Framstad and Øksendal, 2004]. The deterministic
case of maximum principle was first introduced in [Pontryagin et al., 1962]. The
author in [Kushner, 1972] and [Bismut, 1973] further investigate a correspond-
ing maximum principle for Ito diffusions. Subsequently, the maximum principle
for Ito diffusions was developed in [Bensoussan, 1983], [Bensoussan, 1991] and
[Haussmann, 1986]. Recently, a sufficient maximum principle for jump diffusions
was formulated in [Framstad et al, 2004] and is further summarized in the text-
book [Øksendal and Sulem, 2007] from which we state some related results in the
following.
Maximum principle for jump diffusion processes
Assuming that the state process Xt = X
(α)
t of a controlled jump diffusion in
R satisfies the dynamics
dXt = b (t,Xt, αt) dt+ σ (t,Xt, αt) dWt
+
∫
R
γ (t,Xt− , αt− , z) N˜ (dt, dz) ,
(4.1)
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X0 = x ∈ R, where
b : [0, T ]×R× U → R,
σ : [0, T ]×R× U → R and
γ : [0, T ]×R× U ×R→ R
are given functions, and U ⊂ R is a given set. Let N˜ (dt, dz) = N (dt, dz)−ρ (dz) dt
be the compensated Poisson random measure with Le´vy measure ρ. The process
αt = α (t, ω) : [0, T ]×Ω→ R is the control process and assumed to be ca`dla`g and
adapted. We say the control process αt is admissible if there exists a unique and
strong solution to (4.1) , and we denote A the set of all admissible controls.
The performance criterion (objective function) is given by
J (α) = E
[∫ T
0
f (t,Xt, αt) dt+ g (XT )
]
,
where T < ∞ is deterministic, f is continuous and g is concave. We consider an
optimal control problem that finds an admissible α∗ ∈ A such that
J (α∗) = sup
α∈A
J (α) .
The approach is similar to the case of Ito diffusion except we now have to deal
with the jump part. Define the Hamiltonian H : [0, T ]×R×U ×R×R×R→ R
by
H (t, x, α, p, q, r) = f (t, x, α) + b (t, x, α) p+ σ (t, x, α) q (4.2)
+
∫
R
γ (t, x, α, z) r (t, z) ν (dz) ,
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where R is the set of functions r : [0, T ] × R → R such that the integrals in
(4.2) converge. Functions pt, qt and r satisfy the forward and backward stochastic
differential equation (FBSDE)
dpt = −Hx (t, x, α, p, q, r) dt+ qtdWt +
∫
R
r
(
t−, z
)
N˜ (dt, dz) ,
pT = g
′ (XT )
A sufficient maximum principle in [Framstad and Øksendal, 2004] is stated in the
following:
Theorem 4.1. Let α ∈ A with corresponding solution X∗ = X(α∗) and sup-
pose there exists a solution (p∗t , q
∗
t , r
∗ (t, z)) of the corresponding adjoint equation.
Moreover, suppose that
H (t,X∗t , α
∗
t , p
∗
t , q
∗
t , r
∗ (t, ·)) = sup
u∈U
H (t,X∗t , α, p
∗
t , q
∗
t , r
∗ (t, ·))
and
H (x) := max
α∈U
H (t, x, α, p∗t , q
∗
t , r
∗ (t, ·)) (4.3)
exists and is a concave function of x, for all t ∈ [0, T ] . Then α∗ is an optimal
control.
Next, we provide a concrete example as provided by [Øksendal and Sulem,
2006] to see how to implement the above theorem.
Example : The stochastic linear regulator problem
Assuming that the state process Xt = X
(α)
t is given by
dXt = αtdt+ σdWt +
∫
R
zN˜ (dt, dz) , X0 = x,
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and T > 0 is a constant, we aim to solve a stochastic control problem that
minimizes the objective function
J (x) = Ex
[∫ T
0
(
X2t + θα
2
t
)
dt+ λX2T
]
.
Our goal is to find an admissible α∗ ∈ A such that
J (α∗) = inf
α∈A
J (α) .
We can solve this problem by using the stochastic maximum principle. Define the
Hamiltonian
H (t, x, α, p, q, r) = x2 + θα2 + αp+ σq +
∫
R
zr
(
t−, z
)
ν (dz)
Then the corresponding adjoint equation is given by
pt = −2Xtdt+ qtdWt +
∫
R
r
(
t−, z
)
N˜ (dt, dz) ; t < T
pT = 2λXT .
By the stochastic maximum principle, we minimize H with respect to α to
obtain that H (t, x, α, p, q, r) is minimal for
αt = αˆt = − 1
2θ
pt.
To find a solution of the adjoint equation, we consider an ansatz
pt = ξtXt,
where ξt : R→ R is a deterministic function such that ξT = 2λ.
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Note that αt = − ξtXt2θ and
dXt = −ξtXt
2θ
dt+ σdWt +
∫
R
zN˜ (dt, dz) ; X0 = x.
Moreover, differentiating the ansatz, we obtain
dpt = ξtdXt + ξ´tXtdt
= Xt
[
− ξ
2
t
2θ
+ ξ´t
]
dt+ ξtσdWt + ξt
∫
R
zN˜ (dt, dz) .
Hence, ξt is the solution to
ξ´t =
ξ2t
2θ
− 2; t < T
ξT = 2λ.
The solution is then given by
ξt = 2
√
θ
1 + βe
2t√
θ
1− βe 2T√θ
,
where β = λ−
√
θ
λ+
√
θ
e
− 2T√
θ . By using the stochastic maximum principle, we can conclude
that
α∗t = −
ξtXt
2θ
is the optimal control, pt = ξtXt and qt = σξt, r (t
−, z) = ξtz.
4.2 Stochastic differential games with jumps
The noncooperative games analysis without jumps has been investigated in
[Carmona et al., 2014]. Within our proposed interbank lending system, individ-
ual banks can control their rates of borrowing from and lending to the central
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bank. In addition, individual banks are allowed to have jumps as we mentioned
in Chapter 3. The lending/borrowing interaction is determined by the amount in
their reserves. If the reserve of a bank is below the average reserve of all banks,
it will borrow money from the central bank. Conversely, if the reserve of a bank
is above the average reserve, it will be lending money to the central bank. Each
transaction comes with certain cost and fees. To minimize the cost, banks will
seek the optimal strategies considering the distance between the average reserve
and their own reserves. Here we want to see how this game feature with jumps
may affect the systemic risk.
In this chapter, we look at N player games, where N is finite as studied
in [Carmona et al., 2014]. Considering N controls for N players, each optimal
strategy depends on all the other optimal strategies. We are looking for the
equilibria in this game where the state processes are allowed to have jumps. We
first construct closed-loop (feedback) equilibria using an FBSDE approach and
then follow it up with an HJB approach.
Recall in Chapter 3 that the log monetary reserve X it satisfies the dynamics
dX it =
[
a
(
X¯t −X it
)
+ αit
]
dt+ σidW it +
∫
R
γi
(
t−, z
)
N i (dt, dz) , (4.4)
where W it , i = 1, ..., N are independent Brownian motions, a ≥ 0 and σi > 0. Here,∫
R
γi (t, z)N i (dt, dz) is an independent jump process for i = 1, ..., N , where R is
the set such that the integral converges with Poisson random measure N i (dt, dz)
and of jump size γi (t, z) .
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Control problem
As stated in [Carmona et al., 2013], bank i ∈ {1, ..., N} controls its rate of
lending and borrowing (to a central bank) at time t by choosing the control αit in
order to minimize
J i
(
αi, ..., αN
)
= E
{∫ T
0
fi
(
Xt, α
i
t
)
dt+ gi
(
X iT
)}
(4.5)
with
fi
(
x, αi
)
=
1
2
(
αi
)2 − qαi (x¯− xi)+ 
2
(
x¯− xi)2 and (4.6)
gi (x) =
c
2
(
x¯− xi)2 , (4.7)
where the running cost function fi (x, α) is convex in (x, α) under the assumption
q2 ≤ . Notice that the running quadratic cost 1
2
(αi)
2
has been normalized and
that the effect of the parameter q > 0 is to control the incentive to borrowing or
lending: bank i will want to borrow (αit > 0) if X
i
t is smaller than the empirical
mean X¯t and lend (α
i
t < 0) if X
i
t is larger than X¯t. Equivalently, after dividing
by q > 0, this parameter can be thought as a control by the regulator of the cost
of borrowing or lending (with q large meaning low fees). The quadratic terms
in (x¯− xi)2 in the running cost ( > 0) and in the terminal cost (c > 0) penalize
departure from the average.
Recall the state processes Xt in the stochastic maximum principle; we need the
jump part of the state process to be a martingale in order to apply the principle
to solve the control problem. As a result, we assume that
∫
R
γi (t, z) ρi (dz) <∞,
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and then rewrite (4.4) as
dX it =
[
a
(
X¯t −X it
)
+ αit +
∫
R
γi (t, z) ρi (dz)
]
dt+ dLit
=
[
a
(
X¯t −X it
)
+ αit + υ
i
t
]
dt+ dLit, (4.8)
where now dLit = σ
idW it +
∫
R
γi (t−, z) N˜ i (dt, dz) , i = 1, ..., N are independent
martingales with compensated Poisson random measures N˜ i (dt, dz) = N i (dt, dz)−
ρi (dz) dt and υit =
∫
R
γi (t, z) ρi (dz) . Processes (4.8) are now the state processes
for solving control problem (4.5).
4.2.1 Closed-loop equilibria : FBSDE approach
With the state processes (4.8) and the objective function J i, we solve for an
exact closed-loop Nash equilibrium when banks at time t use Markovian strategies
and have the complete information of states of all other banks. When all other
banks k 6= i have chosen their strategies αk (t, x) , bank i has to solve a Markovian
control problem to search for its best strategy among these choices.
Using the Pontryagin approach, the Hamiltonian for bank i is given by
H i
(
x, yi,1, ..., yi,N , α1 (t, x) , ..., αit, ..., α
N (t, x)
)
=
N∑
k 6=i
[
a
(
x¯− xk)+ αk (t, x) + υkt ] yi,k + [a (x¯− xi)+ αi + υit] yi,i
+
1
2
(
αi
)2 − qαi (x¯− xi)+ 
2
(
x¯− xi)2 .
The state processes X it are given by (4.8) with initial condition X
i
0 = x
i. Based
on the Pontryagin principle, the adjoint processes Y it =
(
Y i,jt : j = 1, ..., N
)
, Zit =
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(
Zi,j,kt : j = 1, ..., N, k = 1, ..., N
)
and
(
ri,j,k (t−, z) : j = 1, ..., N, k = 1, ..., N
)
for
i = 1, ..., N are defined as the solutions to the BSDEs
dY i,jt = −∂xjH i
(
Xt, Y
i
t , αt
)
dt+
N∑
k=1
Zi,j,kt dW
k
t +
N∑
k=1
∫
R
ri,j,k
(
t−, z
)
N˜k (dt, dz)
(4.9)
with terminal conditions Y i,jT = ∂xjgi (XT ) .
Without any information about strategy αi, i = 1, ..., N, the partial derivative
with respect to xj of the Hamiltonian H i is given by
∂xjH
i = a
N∑
k=1
(
1
N
− δk,j
)
yi,k +
∑
k 6=i
(
∂xjα
k (t, x)
)
yi,k (4.10)
−qαi
(
1
N
− δi,j
)
+ 
(
x¯− xi)( 1
N
− δi,j
)
.
The stochastic maximum principle (4.3) suggests that one minimizes H i with
respect to αi yields choices
αˆi = −yi,i + q (x¯− xi) , i = 1, ..., N. (4.11)
We assume that all banks are making that choice so as to prove that this choice
is a Nash equilibrium. Our goal is to find a solution to (4.9) and identify each
bank’s own adjoint equation so that bank i obtains its best response. However,
the solution is difficult to find in general but can be obtained in the linear case.
We make the ansatz
Y i,jt =
(
1
N
− δi,j
)[
ηt
(
X¯t −X it
)
+ ϕit
]
, (4.12)
where ηt and ϕ
i
t are deterministic functions satisfying the terminal conditions
ηT = c and ϕ
i
T = 0.
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With ansatz (4.12) , we have the choices of control (4.11)
αk =
[
q + ηt
(
1− 1
N
)] (
x¯− xk)+ (1− 1
N
)
ϕkt ,
∂xjα
k =
[
q + ηt
(
1− 1
N
)](
1
N
− δk,j
)
.
(4.13)
Plugging these choices into (4.10) , the derivation of ∂xjH
i is then given by
∂xjH
i = a
N∑
k=1
(
1
N
− δk,j
)(
1
N
− δi,k
)[
ηt
(
x¯− xi)+ ϕit]
+
∑
k 6=i
[
q + ηt
(
1− 1
N
)](
1
N
− δk,j
)(
1
N
− δi,k
)[
ηt
(
x¯− xi)+ ϕit]
−q
(
1
N
− δi,j
){[
q + ηt
(
1− 1
N
)] (
x¯− xi)+ (1− 1
N
)
ϕit
}
+
(
x¯− xi)( 1
N
− δi,j
)
= a
[
ηt
(
x¯− xi)+ ϕit] N∑
k=1
(
1
N
− δk,j
)(
1
N
− δi,k
)
+
[
q + ηt
(
1− 1
N
)] [
ηt
(
x¯− xi)+ ϕit] 1N ∑
k 6=i
(
1
N
− δk,j
)
+
(
1
N
− δi,j
)(
x¯− xi) [− q2 − qηt(1− 1
N
)]
−
(
1
N
− δi,j
)(
1− 1
N
)
qϕit
= −
(
1
N
− δi,j
)(
x¯− xi) [(a+ q) ηt + 1
N
(
1− 1
N
)
η2t − + q2
]
−
(
1
N
− δi,j
)[
(a+ q)ϕit +
1
N
(
1− 1
N
)
ηtϕ
i
t
]
,
where we used the fact that
∑N
k=1
(
1
N
− δk,j
) (
1
N
− δi,k
)
= − ( 1
N
− δi,j
)
and∑
k 6=i
(
1
N
− δk,j
)
= − ( 1
N
− δi,j
)
.
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We now plug ∂xjH
i into BSDE (4.9) and so the backward equation is given by
dY i,jt = −∂xjH idt+
N∑
k=1
Zi,j,kt dW
k
t +
N∑
k=1
∫
R
ri,j,k
(
t−, z
)
N˜k (dt, dz)
=
(
1
N
− δi,j
)(
X¯t −X it
) [
(a+ q) ηt +
1
N
(
1− 1
N
)
η2t − + q2
]
dt
+
(
1
N
− δi,j
)[
(a+ q)ϕit +
1
N
(
1− 1
N
)
ηtϕ
i
t
]
dt
+
N∑
k=1
Zi,j,kt dW
k
t +
N∑
k=1
∫
R
ri,j,k
(
t−, z
)
N˜k (dt, dz) ,
(4.14)
with the terminal conditions Y i,jT =
(
1
N
− δi,j
) [
c
(
X¯T −X iT
)]
.
With choice controls (4.13) , the forward dynamics are given by
dX it = ∂yi,iH
i
(
Xt, Y
i
t , αt
)
dt+ dLit
=
{[
a+ q +
(
1− 1
N
)
ηt
] (
X¯t −X it
)
+
(
1− 1
N
)
ϕit + υ
i
t
}
dt
+ dL˜it,
(4.15)
with initial conditions X i0 = x
i for i = 1, ..., N . In addition, the dynamics of the
ensemble average X¯t are given by
dX¯t =
[(
1− 1
N
)
ϕ¯t + υ¯t
]
dt+
1
N
N∑
k=1
dL˜kt (4.16)
,where ϕ¯t =
1
N
∑N
k=1 ϕ
i
t and υ¯t =
1
N
∑N
k=1 υ
k
t .
On the other hand, we differentiate the ansatz to obtain
dY i,jt =
(
1
N
− δi,j
)[
η˙t
(
X¯t −X it
)
+ ϕ˙it
]
dt+
(
1
N
− δi,j
)
ηtd
(
X¯t −X it
)
,
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where η˙t and ϕ˙
i
t denote the time-derivative of ηt and ϕ
i
t, respectively. Using
equations (4.15) and (4.16), we further have
dY i,jt =
(
1
N
− δi,j
)(
X¯t −X it
) [
η˙t − ηt
(
a+ q +
(
1− 1
N
)
ηt
)]
dt
+
(
1
N
− δi,j
)[
ϕ˙it + ηt
(
1− 1
N
)(
ϕ¯t − ϕit
)
+ ηt
(
υ¯t − υit
)]
dt
+ ηt
(
1
N
− δi,j
)(
1
N
N∑
k=1
dL˜kt − dL˜it
)
=
(
1
N
− δi,j
)(
X¯t −X it
) [
η˙t − ηt
(
a+ q +
(
1− 1
N
)
ηt
)]
dt
+
(
1
N
− δi,j
)[
ϕ˙it + ηt
(
1− 1
N
)(
ϕ¯t − ϕit
)
+ ηt
(
υ¯t − υit
)]
dt
+ ηt
(
1
N
− δi,j
) 1N
∑N
k=1
(
σkdW kt +
∫
R
γk (t−, z) N˜k (dt, dz)
)
−σidW it −
∫
R
γi (t−, z) N˜ i (dt, dz)

(4.17)
Comparing term by term between the two decompositions (4.14) and (4.17) , we
obtain
Zi,j,kt = ηt
(
1
N
− δi,j
)(
1
N
− δi,k
)
σk,
ri,j,k (t, z) = ηt
(
1
N
− δi,j
)(
1
N
− δi,k
)
γk (t, z) , for k = 1, ..., N.
From the drift term:
η˙t − ηt
(
a+ q +
(
1− 1
N
)
ηt
)
= (a+ q) ηt +
1
N
(
1− 1
N
)
η2t − + q2,
ϕ˙it + ηt
(
1− 1
N
)(
ϕ¯t − ϕit
)
+ ηt
(
υ¯t − υit
)
= (a+ q)ϕit +
1
N
(
1− 1
N
)
ηtϕ
i
t.
Therefore, ηt must satisfy the scalar Riccati equation
η˙t = 2 (a+ q) ηt +
(
1− 1
N2
)
η2t −
(
− q2) (4.18)
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with the terminal condition ηT = c, and ϕ
i
t must satisfy the equation
ϕ˙it = (a+ q)ϕ
i
t − ηt
(
1− 1
N
)[
ϕ¯t −
(
1 +
1
N
)
ϕit
]
− ηt
(
υ¯t − υit
)
, i = 1, ..., N,
(4.19)
with the terminal condition ϕiT = 0.
By taking the average in (4.19), ϕ¯t will satisfy the equation
·
ϕ¯t =
[
a+ q +
1
N
(
1− 1
N
)
ηt
]
ϕ¯t (4.20)
with terminal condition ϕ¯T = 0. Therefore, the solution should be ϕ¯t = 0.
As a result, (4.19) becomes
ϕ˙it = (a+ q)ϕ
i
t +
(
1− 1
N
)
ηtϕ
i
t − ηt
(
υ¯t − υit
)
=
[
a+ q +
(
1− 1
N
)
ηt
]
ϕit − ηt
(
υ¯t − υit
)
= κtϕ
i
t − λit,
(4.21)
with terminal condition ϕiT = 0, where κt = a + q +
(
1− 1
N
)
ηt and λ
i
t =
ηt (υ¯t − υit) , i = 1, ..., N.
According to the exact solutions in [Polyanin and Zaitsev, 2002], the solutions
of (4.21) for i = 1, ..., N are then given by
ϕit = e
− ∫ Tt κsds ·
∫ T
t
(
e
∫ T
s kuduλis
)
ds.
With the optimal control αˆi, the forward dynamics become
dX it =
{[
a+ q +
(
1− 1
N
)
ηt
] (
X¯t −X it
)
+
(
1− 1
N
)
ϕit + υ
i
t
}
dt+ dL˜it
=
{
κt
(
X¯t −X it
)
+ e−
∫ T
t κsds ·
∫ T
t
(
e
∫ T
s kudu
(
1− 1
N
)
λis
)
ds
}
dt+ dLit
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with initial conditions X i0 = x
i.
Observe the drift term in the forward dynamics; each bank finds its best
response with additional liquidity κt
(
X¯t −X it
)
as well as a growth contributed by
compensators υit. Next, we provide a concrete example for the impact of jumps.
The first example is when the noise terms are driven by a jump-diffusion pro-
cess with common intensity rate λ while the second one is with different intensity
rate λi.
Example 4.1. Let Lit = σW
i
t+
∑N it
j=1 ξj, ξj has distribution f (y; θ) =
θ
2
e−|y−µ|θ, θ >
0 and N it is a Poisson process with rate λ. Then, for i=1,...,N, υ
i
t =
∫
R
γi (t, z) ρi (dz) =
λtE (ξj) = λtµ. Furthermore, equation (4.21) becomes
ϕ˙it = κtϕ
i
t − λit = κtϕit
with terminal condition ϕiT = 0. Hence,
ϕit = 0, i = 1, ..., N.
As a result, the forward dynamics of X it ’s become
dX it =
[
κt
(
X¯t −X it
)
+ λtµ
]
dt+ dL˜it
= κt
(
X¯t −X it
)
dt+ dLit, (4.22)
where κt = a+ q +
(
1− 1
N
)
ηt.
Example 4.2. (Compound Poisson with different jump rates) Let Lit = σW
i
t +∑N it
j=1 ξj, ξj has distribution f (y; θ) =
θ
2
e−|y−µ|θ, θ > 0 and N it is a Poisson process
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with rate λi. Then, for i=1,...,N, υit =
∫
R
γi (t, z) ρi (dz) = λitE (ξj) = λitµ. So,
equation (4.21) becomes
ϕ˙it = κtϕ
i
t − λit
= κtϕ
i
t − ηt
(
υ¯t − υit
)
= κtϕ
i
t − ηttµλ˜,
where λ˜ =
(
λ¯− λi) , with terminal condition ϕiT = 0. The solutions are then given
by
ϕit = e
− ∫ Tt κsds ·
∫ T
t
(
e
∫ T
s kuduηsλ˜µs
)
ds.
As a result, the forward dynamics with the best response αi become
dX it =
[
κt
(
X¯t −X it
)
+
(
1− 1
N
)
ϕit + υ
i
t
]
dt+ dL˜it
=
[
κt
(
X¯t −X it
)
+ e−
∫ T
t κsds ·
∫ T
t
(
e
∫ T
s kudu
(
1− 1
N
)
ηsλ˜µs
)
ds
]
dt
+ dLit.
(4.23)
In the first example, although jumps are present in the interbank lending
system, the impact of jumps disappear after we obtain the Nash equilibria as
shown in (4.22) since each bank now has a common intensity rate λ. In fact,
the effect contributed by compensators is absorbed into the Nash equilibrium.
However, if the intensity rate λi is distinct for all i, after obtaining the Nash
equilibria we have an additional drift term (1 − 1
N
)ϕit from the compensator υ
i
t.
As we can see from the drift term in (4.23), (1− 1
N
)ϕit is a function of κt and the
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intensity rate λi. In the next section, we provide an HJB approach in searching
for the feedback Nash equilibria with jumps.
4.2.2 Closed-loop equilibria : HJB approach
In order to search for a closed-loop equilibrium, we start with some settings
as stated in the section 3 in [Matatamvura and Øksendal, 2008]. We assume that
the set of all admissible controls A contains the set of controls such that (4.4) has
a unique strong solution and such that
Et,x
{∫ τS
0
∣∣fi (Xt, αit)∣∣ dt+ ∣∣gi (X iT )∣∣} <∞ (4.24)
for all x ∈ S, where S ⊂ R is a given open set (called the solvency region),
τS = inf {t > 0;Xt 6= S} .
Recall that the value function of bank i in our problem is given by
V i (t, x) = inf
α
Et,x
{∫ T
t
fi
(
Xt, α
i
t
)
dt+ gi
(
X iT
)}
(4.25)
with the cost function fi and gi given in (4.6) and (4.7), respectively, where the
log-monetary reserve X it satisfies the dynamics
dX it =
[
a
(
X¯t −X it
)
+ αit + υ
i
t
]
dt+ dLit, i = 1, ..., N,
with dLit = σ
idW it +
∫
R
γi (t−, z) N˜ i (dt, dz) , i = 1, ..., N being independent mar-
tingales with compensated Poisson random measures N˜ i (dt, dz) = N i (dt, dz) −
ρi (dz) dt and υit =
∫
R
γi (t, z) ρi (dz) .
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Analogous to the classical HJB for optimal control of jump diffusions by using
the dynamic programming principle (see theorem 3.1 in [Øksendal and Sulem,
2007]), one can formulate a verification theorem (see theorem 5.2 in [Matatamvura
and Øksendal, 2008]) in searching for a closed-loop equilibrium in a differential
game. The corresponding HJB equations read as
0 = inf
αi
{
A(α
1(t,x),...αit,...,α
N (t,x))V (t, x) + fi
(
x, αit
)}
, (4.26)
where A(α
1(t,x),...αit,...,α
N (t,x)) is defined as
A(α
1(t,x),...αit,...,α
N (t,x)) (V i) = N∑
j 6=i
[
a
(
x¯− xj)+ αj (t, x) + υjt ] ∂xjV i
+
[
a
(
x¯− xi)+ αi + υit] ∂xjV i
+
σ2
2
N∑
j=1
N∑
k=1
δj,k∂xjxkV
i
+
N∑
j=1
∫
R

V i (t, x+ γj (t, z))− V i (t, x)
−∂xjV i (t, x) γj (t, z)
 ρj (dz)
and
fi
(
x, αit
)
=
(αi)
2
2
− qαi (x¯− xi)+ 
2
(
x¯− xi)2
with the terminal conditions V i (T, x) = gi (X
i
T ) =
c
2
(x¯− xi)2 .
Assume that all players chose αj (t, x) for j 6= i, minimizing the above equation
with respect to αi to obtain the control for bank i
αˆi = q
(
x¯− xi)− ∂xiV i,
where V i is unknown. Put it back to the (4.26) , the HJB equations become
0 =
{
A(αˆ
1
t ,...αˆ
i
t,...,αˆ
N
t )V (t, x) + fi
(
x, αit
)}
(4.27)
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and specifically
0 = ∂tV
i +
N∑
j=1
[
(a+ q)
(
x¯− xj)− ∂xjV j + υjt ] ∂xjV i
+
σ2
2
N∑
j=1
N∑
k=1
δj,k∂xjxkV
i
+
1
2
(
− q2) (x¯− xi)2 + 1
2
(
∂xiV
i
)2
+
N∑
j=1
∫
R

V i (t, x+ γj (t, z))− V i (t, x)
−∂xjV i (t, x) γj (t, z)
 ρj (dz) . (4.28)
We need to find the function V that satisfies (4.28) and then make the ansatz
V i (t, x) =
η˜t
2
(
x¯− xi)2 + ϕ˜it (x¯− xi)+ µt, (4.29)
where η˜t, ϕ˜
i
t and µt are deterministic functions satisfying η˜T = c, ϕ˜
i
T = 0 and
µT = 0 in order to match the terminal conditions for V
i.
The optimal strategies are then given by
αˆi = q
(
x¯− xi)− ∂xiV i
=
(
q +
(
1− 1
N
)
η˜t
)(
X¯t −X it
)
+
(
1− 1
N
)
ϕ˜it, (4.30)
and the controlled dynamics become
dX it =
(
a+ q +
(
1− 1
N
)
η˜t
)(
X¯t −X it
)
dt+
[(
1− 1
N
)
ϕ˜it + υ
i
t
]
dt+ dLit.
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Next, we compute some useful terms
∂xjV
i = η˜t
(
1
N
− δi,j
)(
x¯− xi)+ ϕ˜it( 1N − δi,j
)
,
∂xjxkV
i = η˜t
(
1
N
− δi,j
)(
1
N
− δi,k
)
,
V i
(
t, x+ γj (t, z)
)− V i (t, x) = η˜t
2
 2 (x¯− xi)
(
1
N
− 1) γj (t, z)
+
(
1
N
− 1)2 γj (t, z)2

+ϕ˜it
(
1
N
− 1
)
γj (t, z) and
∂xjV
iγj (t, z) =
 η˜t
(
1
N
− δi,j
)
(x¯− xi)
+ϕ˜it
(
1
N
− δi,j
)
 γj (t, z) .
Note that the term ∂xjV
i corresponds to the adjoint variables yi,j introduced
in the FBSDE approach, and the jump term V i (t, x+ γj (t, z)) − V i (t, x) −
∂xjV
iγj (t, z) correspond to the variables ri,j,k (t, z) for k = 1, ..., N. Plugging
these all into (4.28) , and matching the terms in (x¯− xi), as well as (x¯− xi)2 and
the state-independent terms on both sides, we obtain
·
η˜t = 2 (a+ q) η˜t +
(
1− 1
N2
)
η˜2t −
(
− q2) ,
·
ϕ˜it = (a+ q) ϕ˜
i
t − η˜t
(
1− 1
N
)[
ϕ˜t −
(
1 +
1
N
)
ϕ˜it
]
− η˜t
(
υ¯t − υit
)
, i = 1, ..., N,
µ˙t = −1
2
σ2
(
1− 1
N
)
η˜t,
with terminal conditions η˜T = c, ϕ˜
i
T = 0 and µT = 0. Observe that η˜t and
ϕ˜it satisfy the same equations given by (4.18) and (4.19) , and we conclude that
η˜t = ηt and ϕ˜
i
t = ϕ
i
t for all t < T. As a result, we verify that the closed-loop
equilibrium obtained through the FBSDE approach is indeed a feedback Nash
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equilibrium. The value functions V i using this exact Nash equilibrium are then
given by (4.29).
In fact, the theorem 5.2 in [Matatamvura and Øksendal, 2008] for a two players
game establishes a relationship between the HJB equations and the Nash equilib-
rium which is a fundamental theorem for our differential game with N players. We
give the extended version of theorem 5.2 in [Matatamvura and Øksendal, 2008]
in the following and show that the value functions V i and controls αˆi will satisfy
the assumptions.
Theorem 4.2. Suppose there exists functions V i ∈ C2, i = 1, ..., N, and a Markov
control
(
αˆ1, ..., αˆN
) ∈ A such that
(1) A(α
1(t,x),...αˆit,...,α
N (t,x))V i (t, x) + fi (x, α
i
t) ≥ 0, for all i = 1, ..., N.
(2) A(α
1(t,x),...,αN (t,x)) (τS) ∈ ∂S a.s. on {τS <∞} and
limt→τ−S V
i
(
t,X
(α1(t,x),...,αN (t,x))
t
)
= gi
(
X
(α1(t,x),...,αN (t,x))
τS
)
χ{τS<∞} a.s.
for all i = 1, ..., N, where τS = inf {t > 0;Xt 6= S} .
(3) The families
{
V i
(
t,X
(α1(t,x),...,αN (t,x))
τ
)}
τ∈T
are uniformly integrable for
all i = 1, ..., N, where T is the set of all stopping times τ ≤ τS.
Then
(
αˆ1, ..., αˆN
)
is a Nash equilibrium.
Proof. The proof of this theorem resembles that of theorem 5.2 in [Matatamvura
and Øksendal, 2008], except that the partial differential operator is replaced by
A(α
1(t,x),...αit,...,α
N (t,x)).
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Indeed, we can check that the (1)-(3) will be satisfied and therefore
(
αˆ1, ..., αˆN
)
is a Nash equilibrium. First of all, recall that our control problem (4.25) is a finite
horizon one and τS = T. As a result, (2) is obvious since
lim
t→T
V i
(
t,X
(α1(t,x),...,αN (t,x))
t
)
= gi
(
X
(α1(t,x),...,αN (t,x))
T
)
according to the terminal condition. Moreover, (3) follows by the assumption
(4.24) since the families
{
V i
(
X
(α1(t,x),...,αN (t,x))
τ
)}
τ∈T
=
{
V i
(
X
(α1(t,x),...,αN (t,x))
s
)}
s∈[t,T ]
is bounded by (4.24) and is therefore uniformly integrable.
Secondly, (1) is satisfied since from (4.27) and the optimal control αˆit is a
minimizer of the HJB equation (4.26) we have
0 =
{
A(αˆ
1
t ,...αˆ
i
t,...,αˆ
N
t )V (t, x) + fi
(
x, αˆit
)}
≤
{
A(α
1(t,x),...αˆit,...,α
N (t,x))V (t, x) + fi
(
x, αˆit
)}
for all αit ∈ A, i = 1, ..., N. As a result, we conclude that
(
αˆ1, ..., αˆN
)
is a Nash
equilibrium from the above theorem.
4.3 Numerical results and conclusion
In this section, we provide simulation results of example 4.2 to illustrate the
system with or without the game feature. In section 4.2, with the feedback equi-
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libria, we have the controlled dynamic that
dX it =
[(
a+ q +
(
1− 1
N
)
ηt
)(
X¯t −X it
)
+
(
1− 1
N
)
ϕit + υ
i
t
]
dt
+dL˜it
=
[
At
(
X¯t −X it
)
+Bit
]
dt+ dLit, (4.31)
where At is the effective rate as stated in [Carmona et al., 2014], and B
i
t is the
growth contributed by compensators. Here, L˜it are the compensated indepen-
dent martingales, and υit is a deterministic function which is the mean of the
jumps. Recall that in example 4.2 where Lit = σW
i
t +
∑N it
j=1 ξj, ξj has distribu-
tion f (y; θ) = θ
2
e−|y−µ|θ, θ > 0 and N it is a Poisson process with rate λ
i. Also,
υit =
∫
R
γi (t, z) ρi (dz) = λitE (ξj) = λitµ.
Assume that υit = 1 which suggests the jump of one particular bank i is positive
in average. In order to obtain the Nash equilibrium, bank i has to lend more to
other banks via the central bank. This situation can be seen in Figure 4.1 where
the growth Bt is negative at about −0.4. Figure 4.2 indicates that this growth
remains a constant as time increases. The parameter used in both Figure 4.1 and
Figure 4.2 are N = 10, a = 0, q = 1,  = 10, c = 0, λ = θ = 1 and σ = 1.
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Figure 4.1: Plot of the effective rate At (top red line) and the growth B
i
t (bottom
blue line) for the closed-loop equilibrium in a fixed time t = 1. υit = 1 (dash line)
suggests the jump of one particular bank i is positive in average.
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Figure 4.2: Plot of the effective rate At (top red line) and the growth B
i
t (bottom
blue line) in a fixed time t = 10. Both At and B
i
t remain a constant most of the
time as t increases.
In both Figure 4.3 and Figure 4.4, the upper plots provide the trajectories
without the game feature while the bottom ones give the trajectory with the
game feature. In the upper plot in Figure 4.3, without a game feature, each bank
acts as an independent jump-diffusion process. In the bottom plot in Figure 4.3,
after obtaining an equilibrium, we see that the reserve of a particular bank will
be forced to reach the ensemble average like the lowest trajectory (light blue line)
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shown in Figure 4.3. In other words, the lowest trajectory in Figure 4.3 (identified
as bank j) has a negative jump at time 0.05, when the level of its reserve is much
lower than others, which means it has to borrow more from the central bank in
order to obtain an equilibrium. As a result, the level of bank j′s reserve rises and
gets closer to others in the long run. Figure 4.4 shows that this situation becomes
more obvious as time increases since the effective rate and the growth remain a
constant as shown in Figure 4.2.
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Figure 4.3: Plots of trajectories for the dynamics (4.4) without controls (upper
one) and for the controlled dynamics (4.31) (bottom one) in a fixed time t =
1. Note that the dynamics in both plots have the same jumps and Brownian
increments. The bottom plot shows that, after obtaining an equilibrium, the
reserve of a particular bank will be forced to reach the ensemble average like
the lowest trajectory (light blue line). The parameters used: N = 10, σ = 1,
µ = 1, θ = 1 and λ = 1.
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Figure 4.4: Plots of trajectories for the dynamics (4.4) without controls (upper
one) and for the controlled dynamics (4.31) (bottom one) in a fixed time t = 10.
Compare to Figure 4.3, the level of each bank reserve rises or decreases rapidly
and gets closer to others in the long run.
We also want to know the effect of the differential game on systemic risk.
Considering the systemic event
{
min0≤t≤T X¯t ≤ η
}
, we take the average in (4.31)
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to obtain
dX¯t =
(
1− 1
N
)
ϕ¯tdt+
1
N
N∑
i=1
dLit
=
1
N
N∑
i=1
dLit,
since ϕ¯t = 0 is the solution to (4.20). The ensemble average is again the average
of the noise terms as studied in Chapter 3. The result indicates that the systemic
risk remains even in a differential game with jumps. Hence, allowing a model with
jumps will not affect the systemic risk since the average growth contributed by
the jumps is zero.
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Chapter 5
Systemic risk with a central bank
In this chapter, for the purpose of simplicity, we only consider the diffusion
case. Recall that the dynamics of the log-monetary reserve of N banks in Chapter
3 are given by
dX it =
β
N
N∑
j=1
(
Xjt −X it
)
dt+ σ1dW
i
t , i = 1, .., N. (5.1)
Instead, we consider the log-monetary reserves of N banks X it , which we call
peripheral banks, satisfy dynamics
dX it = β
(
X0t −X it
)
dt+ σdW it , i = 1, .., N, (5.2)
while the central bank X0t satisfies the following dynamics:
dX0t =
α
N
N∑
j=1
(
Xjt −X0t
)
dt+ σ0dW
0
t (5.3)
= α
(
X¯t −X0t
)
dt+ σ0dW
0
t ,
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where σ1 and σ0 are the volatilities of the noise terms for each peripheral bank
and for the central bank, respectively. Let W it , i = 0, ..., N be independent 1-
dimensional Brownian motions. Also, we define X¯t =
∑N
j=1X
j
t as the ensemble
average of reserve of all peripheral banks. Here, α, β > 0 are the rates of the
interactions (borrowing or lending money) between bank i and the central bank.
Note that each peripheral bank is now interacting with the central bank only.
Within the new system, all banks have interactions with each other indirectly
through the central bank. The central bank plays an important role as it acts
as an intermediary to bring all banks into communication. In the following, we
analyze different values for the rates α and β along with numerical results to
indicate how the parameters α and β affect the systemic risk probability. We use
the settings that σ1 = σ0 = 1, T = 1 and a default level η = −0.7.
Case 1: When α = 0 and β is large, for instance β = 100, the entire dynamics
can be read as
dX it = β
(
X0t −X it
)
dt+ σ1dW
i
t , i = 1, ..., N,
dX0t = σ0dW
0
t , (5.4)
which indicate that each peripheral bank is attracted to the central bank X0t where
X0t is driven by a Brownian motion with volatility σ0.
In order to obtain the systemic risk probability, we again investigate the sys-
temic risk event
{
min0≤t≤T X¯t ≤ η
}
. By taking the average in (5.2) , we have the
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dynamic of the ensemble average
dX¯t = β
(
X0t − X¯t
)
dt+
σ1
N
N∑
j=1
dW jt . (5.5)
As long as the rate of interaction β is large enough, flocking will emerge in this
system. The ensemble average of all peripheral banks will be in default if the
reserve of the central bank arrives at default level η < 0. In other words, the
dynamics of the central bank is a representative of all other peripheral banks and,
hence, can be used to compute the systemic risk. Therefore, we have
P
(
min
0≤t≤T
X¯t ≤ η
)
≈ P
(
min
0≤t≤T
X0t ≤ η
)
(5.6)
= P
(
min
0≤t≤T
σ0W
0
t ≤ η
)
= 2Φ
(
η
σ0T
)
(5.7)
≥ 2Φ
(
η
√
N
σT
)
,
where the last term is the systemic risk probability given in the interbank lending
system (5.1) without the dynamic of a central bank (5.3). In Figure 5.1, we
observe that the systemic risk with a central bank, which depends on the number
of banks N , is indeed higher than the one without a central bank which can be
obtained by the formula (5.6).
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Figure 5.1: The upper plot shows trajectories for dynamics with a central bank
and all peripheral banks in case 1. The bottom plot shows the corresponding loss
distribution (red line) as well as the loss distribution (dash line) for the dynamics
(5.3) without a central bank. The parameters used: α = 0, β = 100, N = 10,
t = 1, η = −0.7 and σ1 = σ0 = 1.
Case 2: When β = 0, the entire dynamics can be read as
dX it = σdW
i
t , i = 1, .., N,
dX0t = α
(
X¯t −X0t
)
dt+ σ0dW
0
t
= α
(
σ
N
N∑
i=1
W it −X0t
)
dt+ σ0dW
0
t ,
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which indicate that no interaction drift terms in the system of peripheral banks.
There is only independent Brownian motions while the central bank is still at-
tracted to the ensemble average of reserves of peripheral banks.
Since the dynamics of peripheral banks are merely Brownian motions, we can
expect that the loss distribution will be shown as a Binomial distribution (N, p) ,
N = 10, wtih p ≈ P {min0≤t≤1X it ≤ −0.7}. This Binomial distribution is shown in
both bottom plots of Figure 5.2 and Figure 5.3. Increasing the rate of interaction
α will only increase the stability of the system but will not affect the systemic
risk. In Figure 5.2, for large α, we can observe that the central bank is attracted
to the ensemble average reserve of all peripheral banks. On the other hand, the
trajectory of the central bank is independent of other peripheral banks for small
α as shown in Figure 5.3.
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Figure 5.2: The upper plot shows trajectories for dynamics with a central bank and
all peripheral banks in case 2. One can observe that the central bank (bold line)
is attracted to the ensemble average reserve of all peripheral banks for α = 100.
The bottom plot shows the corresponding loss distribution (red line) as well as
the loss distribution (dash line) for the dynamics (5.3) without a central bank.
The parameters used: N = 10, t = 1, η = −0.7 and σ1 = σ0 = 1.
94
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
0
0.05
0.1
0.15
0.2
0.25
# of default
pr
ob
ab
ilit
y
 
 
w/o central bank
w/ central bank
0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1
−2
−1
0
1
time
lo
g−
m
on
et
ar
y
α=1,β=1
 
 
central bank
Figure 5.3: The upper plot shows trajectories for dynamics with a central bank
and all peripheral banks in case 2. The bottom plot shows the corresponding loss
distribution (red line) as well as the loss distribution (dash line) for the dynamics
(5.3) without a central bank. The parameters used are the same as Figure 5.2.
Case 3: When α and β are both large, for instance α = β = 100, the entire
system can be read as
dX it = β
(
X0t −X it
)
dt+ σ1dW
i
t , i = 1, .., N,
dX0t = α
(
X¯t −X0t
)
dt+ σ0dW
0
t ,
dX¯t = β
(
X0t − X¯t
)
dt+
σ1
N
N∑
j=1
dW jt .
(5.8)
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Now we have two OU processes X0t and X¯t that are attracted to each other.
The reserve of the central bank is mean-reverting to the ensemble average of the
peripheral banks, and vice versa.
The systemic risk can be computed by the same flocking argument, that the
ensemble average of all peripheral banks will be in default if the reserve of the
central bank arrives at default level η. We rewrite (5.8) as
dX¯t = β
(
X0t − X¯t
)
dt+
σ1
N
N∑
j=1
dW jt
= 2β
(
X¯t +X
0
t
2
− X¯t
)
dt+
σ1
N
N∑
j=1
dW jt ,
where the drift term in the second equation indicates that X¯t is attracted to the
average between X¯t and X
0
t . In addition, the dynamics of the average between X¯t
and X0t are given by
d
(
X¯t +X
0
t
2
)
=
α− β
2
(
X¯t −X0t
)
dt+
1
2
(
σ0dW
0
t +
σ1
N
N∑
j=1
dW jt
)
.
As a result, for α = β, we will be able to use
X¯t+X0t
2
to approximate the systemic
risk probability due to the diffusions flocking towards the average. Therefore, we
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have
P
(
min
0≤t≤T
X¯t ≤ η
)
≈ P
(
min
0≤t≤T
X¯t +X
0
t
2
≤ η
)
= P
(
min
0≤t≤T
1
2
(
σ0dW
0
t +
σ1
N
N∑
j=1
dW jt
)
≤ η
)
= P
(
min
0≤t≤T
(√
σ20 +
σ21
N2
W˜t
)
≤ 2η
)
= P
 min
0≤t≤T
W˜t ≤ 2η√
σ20 +
σ21
N2

= 2Φ
 2η√
σ20 +
σ21
N2
T
 , (5.9)
where W˜t is a standard Brownian motion. In Figure 5.4, we see that the sys-
temic risk on the right tail (red line) of the bottom plot is about 18%, which is
comparatively higher than the systemic risk when there is no central bank (3%).
Contrary to the case with small rate α as shown in Figure 5.1, increasing the rate
α when the central bank is attracted more to the average reserve of the peripheral
banks will reduce the systemic risk. It suggests that with reasonable monitoring
of liquidity, the interbank lending system becomes more stable when the central
bank coordinates with peripheral banks closely.
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Figure 5.4: The upper plot shows trajectories for dynamics with a central bank
and all peripheral banks in case 3. The bottom plot shows the corresponding loss
distribution (red line) as well as the loss distribution (dash line) for the dynamics
(5.3) without a central bank. The parameter used: α = 100, β = 100, N = 10,
t = 1, η = −0.7 and σ1 = σ0 = 1.
In fact, we investigate two systemic risks: (5.7) with a small rate α and (5.9)
with a large rate α. Assume that
2Φ
(
η
σ0T
)
> 2Φ
 2η√
σ20 +
σ21
N2
T
 , (5.10)
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where η < 0, σ1 is the volatility of peripheral banks and σ0 is the volatility of the
central bank. Then from (5.10) , we derive that
σ21
N2
< 3σ20. (5.11)
Clearly, our setting σ1 = σ0 = 1 and N = 10 satisfies (5.11) which indicates
that the systemic risk with a large rate α is lower than the systemic risk with a
small one. As we mentioned earlier, with reasonable monitoring of liquidity, i.e.,
in a system with a large α, the system becomes more stable and can therefore
reduce the systemic risk with appropriate assumptions about the volatilities of
both the central bank and the peripheral banks. In the next section, with the aim
to increase system stability with a central bank, we will solve an optimal control
problem related to the central bank to further reduce the systemic risk.
5.1 Stochastic optimal control with a central bank
We consider the log-monetary reserves of N banks which we call peripheral
banks that satisfy the following dynamics:
dX it = β
(
X0t −X it
)
dt+ σ1dW
i
t , i = 1, .., N,
whereas the central bank satisfies the following dynamics:
dX0t = α
0
tdt+ σ0dW
0
t , (5.12)
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where σ1 and σ0 are the volatilities of the noise terms for each peripheral bank
and for the central bank, respectively. Let α0t ∈ R be our control process as
well as W it , i = 0, ..., N , independent 1-dimensional Brownian motions. Recall
that X¯t =
∑N
j=1X
j
t is defined as the ensemble average of reserves of all peripheral
banks and the dynamic is given by (5.5). With the control variable α0t , the central
bank aims to minimize the objective function
J0 = E

∫ T
0
(
1
2
(α0t )
2 − q0α0t
(
X¯t −X0t
)
+ 0
2
(
X¯t −X0t
)2)
dt
+ c0
2
(
X¯T −X0T
)2
 ,
where the parameters q0, 0 and c0 are constants that satisfy the same conditions
given in Chapter 4.
We solve the control problem by using a similar FBSDE approach that we
used in section 4.2. The Hamiltonian is given by
H
(
x0, x1, ..., xN , y0, α0
)
= y0α0 +
1
2
(
α0
)2 − q0α0 (x¯− x0)+ 0
2
(
x¯− x0)2 .
Minimizing H with respect to α0 yields
∂H
∂α0
= y0 + α0 − q0
(
x¯− x0) = 0 and so
αˆ0 = −y0 + q0
(
x¯− x0) .
The partial derivative of αˆ0with respect to x0 gives
∂α0
∂x0
= −q0. (5.13)
100
Thus, with (5.13) , we have
∂H
∂x0
= y0
∂α0
∂x0
+ α0
∂α0
∂x0
− q0∂α
0
∂x0
(
x¯− x0)+ q0α0 − 0 (x¯− x0)
=
(
x¯− x0) [q20 − 0]− y0q0.
As a result, the adjoint equation is given by
dY 0t =
[(
X¯t −X0t
) (−q20 + 0)+ Y 0t q0] dt+ Z0t dW 0t + N∑
i=1
ZitdW
i
t ,
where W it , i = 0, 1, ..., N are independent Brownian motions. We then make the
ansatz
Y 0t = −ηt
(
X¯t −X0t
)
,
where ηt is a deterministic function satisfying the terminal condition ηT = c0.
Given the optimal control αˆ with the ansatz, the forward dynamics become
dX0t = (ηt + q0)
(
X¯t −X0t
)
dt+ σ0dW
0
t . (5.14)
The adjoint equation is then given by
dY 0t =
(
X¯t −X0t
) (−q20 + 0 − ηtq0) dt+ Z0t dW 0t + N∑
i=1
ZitdW
i
t . (5.15)
Differentiating the ansatz results in
dY 0t = −η˙t
(
X¯t −X0t
)
dt− ηtd
(
X¯t −X0t
)
= −η˙t
(
X¯t −X0t
)
dt− ηt
 β
(
X0t − X¯t
)
dt+ σ1
N
∑N
j=1 dW
j
t
− (ηt + q0)
(
X¯t −X0t
)
dt− σ0dW 0t

=
(
X¯t −X0t
)
[−η˙t + ηtβ + ηt (ηt + q0)] dt
− ηt
[
σ1
N
N∑
j=1
dW jt − σ0dW 0t
]
.
(5.16)
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Identifying the drift term in (5.15) and (5.16) we obtain
η˙t = η
2
t + ηt (2q0 + β) + q
2
0 − 0,
with terminal condition ηT = c0, which is a Riccati equation with an exact so-
lution. In the controlled dynamic (5.14), the effect of the central bank using its
optimal strategy corresponds to the interactions between all peripheral banks and
the central bank at the effective rate ηt + q0. According to the analysis in [Car-
mona et al, 2014], ηt will tend to a constant as time goes to infinity. With the
effective rate ηt + q0, we provide the corresponding loss distributions in Figure
5.5.
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Figure 5.5: Plot of the corresponding loss distribution (blue line) for the controlled
dynamic (5.14) as well as the loss distribution (red line) for the dynamics (5.4)
without control. The parameter used: β = 100, N = 10, t = 1, η = −0.7,
σ1 = σ0 = 1, q0 = 1, 0 = 10 and c0 = 0.
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From the right tail of the loss distributions in Figure 5.5, it is interesting to
see that the systemic risk (red line) is higher (about 42%) without the control α0t
in (5.4). Conversely, if the central bank can now monitor the liquidity between all
peripheral banks and itself (i.e., controls difference of the reserve flow X¯t −X0t ),
it will reduce the systemic risk. One of the purposes of having a central bank
is to stabilize the entire banking system. However, introducing a central bank
in our system without any controls as stated in (5.4) (i.e. all peripheral banks
are attracted to a Brownian motion) will result in a higher systemic risk. In
other words, in a system where the central bank does not monitor the liquidity,
the probability that all peripheral banks will be in default simultaneously will
rise. In the next section, we further assume that each peripheral bank can now
control its rate of interaction between each other and we aim to solve a stochastic
differential game as studied in Chapter 4. However, the equilibrium for the finite
players’ game has not been solved in our case. In the next section, we will use
another approach called a mean-field game inspired by [Carmona and Zhu, 2014]
within which the authors provide an approach to mean-field games with major
and minor players.
5.2 A mean-field game approach
We consider X0t and X
i
t as the log-monetary reserve of a central bank and
peripheral banks, respectively, which satisfy the following dynamics with control
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variables α0t and α
i
t
dX it = α
i
tdt+ σ1dW
i
t , i = 1, ..., N,
dX0t = α
0
tdt+ σ0dW
0
t .
The central bank and all peripheral banks aim to minimize the objective functions
J i(α0, α1, ..., αN) = E

∫ T
0
(
1
2
(αit)
2 − qαit (X0t −X it) + 2 (X0t −X it)
2
)
dt
+ c
2
(X0T −X iT )2
 ,
J0(α0, α1, ..., αN) = E

∫ T
0
(
1
2
(α0t )
2 − q0α0t
(
X¯t −X0t
)
+ 0
2
(
X¯t −X0t
)2)
dt
+ c0
2
(
X¯T −X0T
)2
 ,
where X¯t =
1
N
∑N
i=1 X
i
t and the parameters q, q0, , 0, c and c0 satisfy the same
conditions as mentioned earlier. We now use a mean-field game approach to obtain
an approximate Nash equilibrium. Consider the limit of X¯t as N →∞ :
mt = lim
N→∞
1
N
N∑
i=1
X it .
A key idea in mean-field games states that the control problem for finite players
can be regarded as solving the two-player control problem
inf
α1
E

∫ T
0
(
1
2
(α1t )
2 − qα1t (X0t −X1t ) + 2 (X0t −X1t )
2
)
dt
+ c
2
(X0T −X1T )2
 , (5.17)
inf
α0
E

∫ T
0
(
1
2
(α0t )
2 − q0α0t (mt −X0t ) + 02 (mt −X0t )
2
)
dt
+ c0
2
(mT −X0T )2
 , (5.18)
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subject to the dynamics
dX0t = α
0
tdt+ σ0dW
0
t ,
dX1t = α
1
tdt+ σ1dW
1
t , (5.19)
where W 0t and W
1
t are independent Brownian motions. Assuming that X
0
0 = x
0
0
and X10 = x
1
0. We solve the above control problem sequentially by the following
procedure.
1. Fix mt = limN→∞ 1N
∑N
i=1X
i
t , where X
i
t , i = 1, .., N, are defined as the
peripheral banks. In the mean-field game setting, one may consider mt as
a function of X0t . As a result, we may assume that mt = X
0
t since X¯t
might be close to X0t in the mean-field games. Recall that the initial value
X00 = x
0
0 = m0.
2. Since mt is given, we can solve the one player control problem (5.18) using
only the dynamic of the central bank.
3. Given α0 is known, we then solve the control problem (5.17) with dynamics
(5.19).
4. Finally, we solve the fixed point problem : find mt = E (X1t |F0t ) for all t with
X10 = x
1
0 , where (F0t )t≥0 denotes the filtration generated by the Brownian
motion W 0t .
With mt = X
0
t is known.
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We solve the control problem (5.18) . With mt = X
0
t , the objective function
becomes
inf
α0
E
{∫ T
0
1
2
(
α0t
)2
dt
}
,
and so the optimal control α0 is zero by minimizing the above objective function.
The forward dynamics are then given by
dX0t = σ0dW
0
t .
With α0t is known.
With α0t = 0, the dynamics become
dX0t = σ0dW
0
t
dX1t = α
1
tdt+ σ1dW
1
t ,
in order to minimize the cost functional
inf
α1
E

∫ T
0
(
1
2
(α1t )
2 − qα1t (X0t −X1t ) + 2 (X0t −X1t )
2
)
dt
+ c
2
(X0T −X1T )2
 .
The Hamiltonian is given by
H1 = y1α1 +
1
2
(
α1
)2 − qα1 (x0 − x1)+ 
2
(
x0 − x1)2 .
Minimizing with respect to α1, we obtain
∂H1
∂α1
= y1 + α1 − q (x0 − x1) = 0
αˆ1 = −y1 + q (x0 − x1) .
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Also, we have
∂H1
∂x1
= qα1 −  (x0 − x1) .
Plugging in the optimal control αˆ1, we have
∂H1
∂x1
= q
(−y1 + q (x0 − x1))−  (x0 − x1)
= −y1q + (x0 − x1) (q2 − ) .
Therefore, the corresponding FBSDEs are given by
dX1t =
[
q
(
X0t −X1t
)− Y 1t ] dt+ σ1dW 1t and
dY 1t =
[− (X0t −X1t ) (q2 − )+ Y 1t q] dt+ Z1t dW 1t + Z0t dW 0t .
We then make the ansatz
Y 1t = −φt
(
X0t −X1t
)
,
where φt is a deterministic function with terminal condition φT = c. The FBSDEs
become
dX1t = (φt + q)
(
X0t −X1t
)
dt+ σ1dW
1
t and
dY 1t =
(
X0t −X1t
) [(
− q2)− φtq] dt+ Z1t dW 1t + Z0t dW 0t . (5.20)
Differentiating the ansatz gives
dY 1t = −φ˙t
(
X0t −X1t
)
dt− φtd
(
X0t −X1t
)
= −φ˙t
(
X0t −X1t
)
dt− φt
 σ0dW 0t
− (φt + q) (X0t −X1t ) dt− σ1dW 1t

=
(
X0t −X1t
) [−φ˙t + φt (φt + q)] dt− φt [σ0dW 0t − σ1dW 1t ] .
(5.21)
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Identifying the drift terms in (5.20) and (5.21) yields
φ˙t = φ
2
t + 2φtq − + q2,
with terminal condition φT = c, which is again a Riccati equation with an exact
solution. Moreover, identifying the noise terms in the two decompositions gives
Z1t = φtσ1,
Z0t = −φtσ0.
Given the optimal control αˆ1t , the forward dynamics become
dX0t = σ0dW
0
t
dX1t = (φt + q)
(
X0t −X1t
)
dt+ σ1dW
1
t .
In addition, with the initial condition x0, we have
dX1t = (φt + q)
[(
x0 + σ0W
0
t
)−X1t ] dt+ σ1dW 1t . (5.22)
By conditioning with respect to F0t , we have
dE
(
X1t |F0t
)
= (φt + q)
[(
x00 + σ0W
0
t
)− E (X1t |F0t )] dt.
To complete the last step of the procedure, one has to solve the fixed point problem
: find mt = E (X1t |F0t ) for all t, where E (X1t |F0t ) is given by the above equation
with initial value E (X10 |F0t ) = x0. One can observe that in a mean-field game
setting, the dynamic of peripheral bank X1t is now attracted to the central bank,
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which is in fact a Brownian motion. As a result of the mean-field game, the optimal
control αˆ1t might be the approximate Nash equilibrium if there are infinitely many
players.
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Chapter 6
Conclusion
In Chapter 2, we investigated a stochastic Cucker-Smale model when jumps
were present in the noise term. We showed that the time-asymptotic flocking
defined in [Ha et. al., 2009] was still valid even with jumps. However, there was
one situation that might lead to flocking failure—when the distribution of each
jump were not identical. In order to obtain flocking behavior, we had to make
the assumption that each jump was identically distributed, otherwise any strong
positive or negative jump may break the symmetry of the stochastic system and
further cause flocking failure. In some cases, a jump may also be considered as
the characteristic of a leading particle.
In Chapter 3, we successfully extended the result in [Fouque and Sun, 2013]
to a jump-diffusion case, that is, the systemic risk in an interbank lending system
would increase when the noise terms were driven by jump-diffusion processes.
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Moreover, both the systemic risk and the risk of individual banks would increase.
This makes sense since if there was a dramatic increase or decrease in the reserves
of one bank, this bank will more likely be in default. We gave an approach to
compute the systemic risk in the jump-diffusion case and investigated the order
of convergence as the number of banks N increased.
In Chapter 4, each bank controlled its rate of borrowing/lending money through
a central bank in order to minimize a cost function where the dynamics of the
reserve processes were driven by jump diffusion processes. We utilized the method
of stochastic optimal control with jump-diffusions to solve a Nash equilibria in a
differential game. The closed-loop equilibria can be obtained by both an FBSDE
approach through the maximum principle and an HJB approach through dynamic
programming. We obtained a similar result as stated in [Carmona et al, 2014] that
the system created additional liquidity and the central bank acted as a clearing
house. Additionally, linear growth contributed by jumps were also presented after
obtaining the equilibrium. Based on the assumption that each bank had chosen
their best strategy to obtain an equilibrium, one had to pay more if it possessed
more reserve at any time and vice versa. In other words, if one of the banks pos-
sessed more reserves than the average reserve, it had to contribute more (lending
money) in the system. As for the systemic risk, the effect of jumps in this dif-
ferential game was zero since the average growth contributed by jumps was zero.
The systemic risk would not be reduced in a game setting with jumps.
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In Chapter 5, we obtained a higher systemic risk with a specified dynamics
for the central bank. Each peripheral bank was interacting with one another
indirectly through the central bank. The activity of borrowing and lending had
to go through the central bank. We showed that the systemic risk depended on
the relation of the volatility between a central bank and the peripheral banks.
The central bank played an important role in stabilizing the banking system by
controlling the liquidity between all peripheral banks and itself, otherwise the
system would be vulnerable and result in a higher systemic risk. However, if
the central bank monitored the liquidity closely and minimized the difference of
reserves between all peripheral banks and itself, it would reduce the systemic risk.
By solving an optimal control problem, we could reduce the systemic risk. At
the end of Chapter 5, we also gave a mean-field game approach for approximately
solving a differential game with finite players. Another extended model with major
banks and small banks is given and solved in a sequential way in the appendix.
The mathematical model we developed showed that the systemic risk would
rise when instantaneous shocks occur. In other words, the probability that all
banks will reach the critical level at the same time would be higher when jumps are
taken into consideration. Moreover, under the circumstance that each bank was
acting toward their best self-interest, the model showed that systemic risk would
possibly increase when one individual bank experienced slightly more shocks than
the rest. By establishing this mathematical model, we have characterized the
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banking system and understood the effect of jumps on systemic risk. Through
the incorporation of a game feature with jumps, the result of this study also
aimed to shed light on the regulation of banking system and contribute to the
understanding of the relationship between individual banks, as well as the role
that central banks should play to provide more liquidity.
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Appendix A
Stochastic sequential differential
games
We considerX0,it andX
1,i
t as the log-monetary reserve of major banks and small
banks, respectively. We consider the following dynamics with control variables α0,it
and α1,it
dX0,it = α
0,i
t dt+ σ0dW
0,i
t , i = 1, ..., N
dX1,it = α
1,i
t dt+ σ1dW
1,i
t .
Major banks X0,it control their rate α
0,i
t of borrowing/lending from/to a central
bank while small banks control their rate α1,it of borrowing/lending from/to the
major banks X0,it , i = 1, ..., N, in order to minimize their respective objective
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functions:
J0,i(α) = E

∫ T
0
(
1
2
(
α0,it
)2 − q0α0,it (X¯0t −X0,it )+ 02 (X¯0t −X0,it )2) dt
+ c0
2
(
X¯0T −X0,iT
)2
 ,
J1,i = E

∫ T
0
 12
(
α1,it
)2 − q1α1,it (X0,it −X1,it )+ 12 (X0,it −X1,it )2
−α0,it α1,it
 dt
+ c1
2
(
X0,iT −X1,iT
)2

.
where α = (α0,1, ..., α0,N , α1,1, ..., α1,N). We now solve the open-loop equilibria by
using the Pontryagin approach. The Hamiltonian for major banks X0,i and small
banks X1,i are given by
H0,i
(
x, y0,i,1, ..., y0,i,N , α0,i, ..., α0,N
)
=
N∑
k=1
α0,ky0,i,k +
1
2
(
α0,i
)2 − q0α0,i (x¯0 − x0,i)+ 0
2
(
x¯0 − x0,i)2 ,
and
H1,i
(
x, y1,i,1, ..., y1,i,N , α1,i, ..., α1,N
)
=
N∑
k=1
α1,ky1,i,k +
1
2
(
α1,i
)2 − q1α1,i (x0,i − x1,i)+ 1
2
(
x0,i − x1,i)2
−α0,it α1,it .
The major banks choose to minimize the cost function J0,i, so we minimize
H0,i over α0,i to obtain choices
y0,i,i + α0,i − q0
(
x¯0 − x0,i) = 0, i = 1, ..., N
αˆ0,i = −y0,i,i + q0
(
x¯0 − x0,i) .
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The ansatz for y0,i,j :
Y 0,i,jt = φ
0
t
(
1
N
− δi,j
)(
x¯0 − x0,i) ,
where φ0t is a deterministic function satisfying the terminal condition φ
0
T = c0.
So, the optimal controls for the major banks are given by
αˆ0,i =
(
φ0t
(
1− 1
N
)
+ q0
)(
x¯0 − x0,i) .
The adjoint equation for Y 0,i,jt is given by
dY 0,i,jt = −
∂H0,i
∂x0,j
dt+
N∑
k=1
Z0,i,j,kt dW
0,k
t .
The small banks anticipate this response and insert major banks’ reaction into
their own cost function J1,i.
J1,i = E

∫ T
0
 12
(
α1,it
)2 − q1α1,it (X0,it −X1,it )+ 12 (X0,it −X1,it )2
−α1,it
(
φ0t
(
1− 1
N
)
+ q0
)
(x¯0 − x0,i)
 dt
+ c1
2
(
X0,iT −X1,iT
)2

.
Using the Pontryagin approach, the Hamiltonian for small banks X1,i is given
by
H1,i
(
x, y1,i,1, ..., y1,i,N , α1,i, ..., α1,N
)
=
N∑
k=1
α1,ky1,i,k +
1
2
(
α1,i
)2 − q1α1,i (x0,i − x1,i)+ 1
2
(
x0,i − x1,i)2
−α1,it
(
φ0t
(
1− 1
N
)
+ q0
)(
x¯0 − x0,i) ,
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The small banks choose to minimize the cost function J1,i, so we minimize
H1,i over α1,i to obtain choices
y1,i,i + α1,i − q1
(
x0,i − x1,i)− (φ0t (1− 1N
)
+ q0
)(
x¯0 − x0,i) = 0
αˆ1,i = −y1,i,i + q1
(
x0,i − x1,i)+ (φ0t (1− 1N
)
+ q0
)(
x¯0 − x0,i) .
The ansatz for y1,i,j :
Y 1,i,jt = φ
1
t δi,j
(
X¯0t −X0,it
)− ηtδi,j (X0,it −X1,it ) ,
where φ1t and ηt are deterministic functions satisfying the terminal conditions
φ1T = 0 and ηT = c1, respectively.
So, the optimal control αˆ1,i is given by
αˆ1,i =
(
X¯0t −X0,it
) [−φ1t + φ0t (1− 1N
)
+ q0
]
+
(
X0,it −X1,it
)
(ηt + q1)
The adjoint equations are then given by
dY 1,i,jt = −
∂H1,i
∂x1,j
dt+
N∑
k=1
Z1,i,j,kt dW
1,k
t
= −δi,j
(
X¯0t −X0,it
) [
(ηt + q1)
(
−φ1t + φ0t
(
1− 1
N
)
+ q0
)]
dt
−δi,j
(
X0,it −X1,it
) [
(ηt + q1)
2 − 1
]
dt+
N∑
k=1
Z1,i,j,kt dW
1,k
t
The dynamics for the difference X0,it −X1,it are given by
d
(
X0,it −X1,it
)
=
[
φ1t
(
X¯0t −X0,it
)− (ηt + q1) (X0,it −X1,it )] dt
+σ0dW
0,i
t − σ1dW 1,it .
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Differentiating the ansatz to obtain
dY 1,i,jt =
[
φ˙1t δi,j
(
X¯0t −X0,it
)− η˙tδi,j (X0,it −X1,it )] dt
+φ1t δi,jd
(
X¯0t −X0,it
)− ηtδi,jd (X0,it −X1,it )
=
[
φ˙1t δi,j
(
X¯0t −X0,it
)− η˙tδi,j (X0,it −X1,it )] dt
+φ1t δi,j
[
−
(
φ0t
(
1− 1
N
)
+ q0
)(
X¯0t −X0,it
)
dt+
σ0
N
N∑
j=1
dW 0,jt − σ0dW 0,it
]
−ηtδi,j

[
(φ1t )
(
X¯0t −X0,it
)− (ηt + q1) (X0,it −X1,it )] dt
+σ0dW
0,i
t − σ1dW 1,it

=

−δi,j
(
X¯0t −X0,it
) [−φ˙1t + φ1t (φ0t (1− 1N )+ q0)+ ηt (φ1t )]
−δi,j
(
X0,it −X1,it
)
[η˙t − ηt (ηt + q1)]
 dt
+φ1t δi,j
[
σ0
N
N∑
j=1
dW 0,jt − σ0dW 0,it
]
− ηtδi,j
(
σ0dW
0,i
t − σ1dW 1,it
)
.
Identifying the term
(
X¯0t −X0,it
)
and
(
X0,it −X1,it
)
to obtain the following
equations:
φ˙1t = φ
1
t
[
φ0t
(
1− 1
N
)
+ q0 + 2ηt + q1
]
− (ηt + q1)
[
φ0t
(
1− 1
N
)
+ q0
]
η˙t = 2η
2
t + 3ηtq1 + q
2
1 − 1,
where φ1T = 0 and ηT = c1.
Thus, for i = 1, ..., N, the optimal control for the major players are give by
αˆ1,i =
(
X¯0t −X0,it
) [−φ1t + φ0t (1− 1N
)
+ q0
]
+
(
X0,it −X1,it
)
(ηt + q1)
126
As a result, with the optimal control, the dynamics will become
dX0,it =
[(
φ0t
(
1− 1
N
)
+ q0
)(
X¯0t −X0,it
)]
dt+ σ0dW
0,i
t
dX1,it =
[(
φ0t
(
1− 1
N
)
+ q0 − φ1t
)(
X¯0t −X0,it
)
+ (ηt + q1)
(
X0,it −X1,it
)]
dt
+σ1dW
1,i
t .
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